Abstract

This paper combines gender and class in an analysis of patterns of inequalities in different types of welfare states. The development of gendered agency inequality with respect to democratic politics, tertiary education, and labor force participation is analyzed in 18 OECD countries. Class inequality is described in terms of disposable household income. The paper develops a new typology of welfare states based on institutional structures of relevance for gender inequality as well as class inequality. The combination of gender and class throws new light on the driving forces behind inequalities and on the role of welfare states in this context.

The study of the causes and consequences of inequality has traditionally focused on the role of socioeconomic class in the distribution of our worldly goods. In this context public policies, especially those reflected in the development of different types of welfare states, have been seen as major intervening variables. In recent years, however, in the social sciences as well as in history, feminist scholars have criticized mainstream analyses of inequality and welfare states for their neglect of gender aspects (Fraser 1989; Gordon 1990;
Hernes 1987; Hobson 1990; Leira 1992; Lewis 1992, 1997; O'Connor 1993, 1996; Orloff 1993; Pateman 1988; Sainsbury 1996; Shaver 1989; Siim 1988; Williams 1995). They have forcefully argued that gender is one of the important factors that must be considered in analyses of inequality and welfare states. Yet few if any of them maintain that gender should replace factors such as class, race, and ethnicity in the study of distributive processes. Instead there seems to be a growing consensus that gender as well as class, ethnicity, and race are all socially constructed properties and that each of them must be brought into the analysis without excluding the others (e.g., O'Connor, Orloff, and Shaver 1999). Against such a background this paper attempts to integrate gender and class into a macro-level analysis of different dimensions of inequality and examines the ways in which these two factors interact with different types of welfare states in the distributive processes. In such an effort we face major challenges with respect to the conceptualization of inequality, the development of typologies of welfare states of relevance for gender as well as class, the analysis of the driving forces behind inequality, and the unit to be used in analyses of inequality.

One of the challenges posed by an attempt to combine gender and class in the analysis of social differentiation is how to widen the conceptualization of inequality, now often routinely confined to differences in terms of occupational standing and material standards of living. While inequalities with respect to advantage rooted in the division of labor within the sphere of production have been and remain central for class inequality, in the context of gender inequality these aspects have to be complemented. We must therefore reconsider the old question: Inequality of what? A focus on gender inequality highlights additional dimensions of the division of labor in society, divisions between production and reproduction, between paid and unpaid work. Thus it points to the importance of distinguishing between, on the one hand, inequality in terms of manifest achievements of well-being and, on the other hand, inequality in terms of freedom to achieve. A comprehensive analysis of the role of gender in the context of inequality thus necessitates a broadening of our research focus to consider not only inequality in actual achievements, but also potential or latent aspects of inequality reflected in the concept of agency and indicated by the range of alternative achievements and accomplishments between which an actor has the capability to choose. While such a broadening of focus is valuable in analyses of inequalities in terms of class, it is essential in modern debates on gender inequality. We therefore have to tackle the central question of what aspects of agency are likely to be fruitful in research on inequality with respect to gender.
Another challenge faces us in the analysis of the role of welfare states for gender inequality. In recent decades research on inequality and welfare states has to a large extent become comparative, focusing on the causes and consequences of the "natural experiments" with different types of public policies that have taken place in the Western countries. In this context, typologies of welfare states have come to serve as heuristic tools for organizing and interpreting the wealth of information available in comparative studies. A question here is if typologies should be based on broad sets of indicators running from assumed driving forces over the shape of public policies to policy outcomes, or more specifically on the institutional characteristics of welfare state policies. Furthermore, as feminist scholars have pointed out, welfare state typologies have primarily reflected factors associated with class, but have neglected the gender dimension. While this criticism need not invalidate the use of extant typologies in studies on class-related aspects of distributive processes, they underline the need to design typologies of welfare states that are helpful in comparative analyses of the role of public policies for gender inequality as well as for class inequality. Such an effort raises the important question of whether particular types of welfare states can be expected to differ with respect to their consequences for inequality in terms of gender and in terms of class.

The integration of gender and class in the study of inequality and welfare states also requires a reconsideration of the driving forces and actors in distributive processes. Since class inequality typically has been interpreted in terms of the division of labor in the sphere of economic activity, the major driving forces generating class inequality have often been conceived of in terms of actors such as political parties, business organizations, and labor unions. While these major actors are likely to loom large in terms of gender inequality, in a gender perspective, additional social forces can be expected to be of significance. Important among them are actors engaged in the formulation and promulgation of ideologies and policies related to the family and to caring work, such as churches and women’s movements.

Analyses of the role of gender in distributive processes brings the question of a fruitful unit of analysis to the fore. As is well known, in the study of class inequality, the family and the household are typically taken as basic observational units, and in analyses of income distribution it is conventionally assumed that income is shared equally between husband and wife. Within the nuclear family, statistically husband and wife tend to have similar socioeconomic and racial characteristics. Nuclear families are, however, always differentiated with respect to sex. Unlike class and race, the gender dimension
thus constantly cuts through the nuclear family and draws attention to the role of intrafamily differentiation in distributive processes. The fact that, in principle, all individuals can be described in terms of class as well as gender suggests the fruitfulness of a simultaneous analysis of the role of these two factors for inequality, focusing on the possible interactions between class and gender in distributive processes. Instead of assuming that within the family material resources and other forms of advantage are equally distributed, it would appear fruitful to view the nuclear family as a more or less stable coalition of adult individuals with partly shared, partly conflicting interests, a coalition involved in distributive strife at the societal level as well as in internal bargaining. The analysis of gender inequality can, however, not be limited to the family, but must be extended to include all citizens as well as the macro level (Ferree and Hall 1996). As formulated by Acker (1989, 239), relations of gender and class may be produced within the same ongoing practices so that “looking at them from one angle we see class, from another we see gender, neither is complete without the other.”

This paper will discuss the relationships of gender and class to different dimensions of inequality and develops a typology of welfare states, a typology which hopefully is of heuristic value in the analysis of inequalities with respect to gender as well as class.¹ Central questions concern the conceptualization and operationalization of dimensions of inequality of relevance for gender and class, the driving forces between different types of inequalities, and the role of welfare states for the modification and shaping of patterns of inequalities with respect to gender and class. A relatively broad spectrum of dimensions of gender inequality will be discussed, but the focus will be on arenas of agency inequality likely to be affected by welfare state policies. The empirical analysis covers what now are eighteen rich industrialized countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.²

The paper is organized in the following way. We begin by discussing questions concerning the conceptualization of inequality and the fruitfulness of different dimensions of inequality in the analysis of gender differences in the rich industrialized countries. Thereafter we examine development during the period after World War II of gender inequalities with respect to agency in areas of political representation and tertiary education before we focus on the analysis of gendered agency differences in terms of participation in socioeconomic stratification processes and the labor force. To illuminate the role of public policies and institutional structures for gender inequalities in labor
force participation, an agency-relevant typology of gender policy institutions is outlined and applied to our sample of countries. This is followed by an analysis of, on the one hand, the role of the major political tendencies for the development of gender policy institutions in these countries and, on the other hand, of the possible effects of gender policy institutions for gendered agency differences in the stratification process and the labor market. Thereafter we turn to an examination of class inequality in terms of income distribution and poverty, analyzing differences between countries against the background of a class-related typology of welfare states focusing on social insurance institutions. An analysis of the relationships between welfare state institutional structures relevant for inequality with respect to gender as well as class precedes the concluding discussion.

Gender, Inequality Dimensions, and the Socioeconomic Stratification Process

In the analysis of gender inequality, differences with respect to material standards of living have traditionally played an important part. According to these analyses, the assumption that within the family, income is shared equally between husband and wife has obviously not had universal applicability. Thus, for example, when Adam Smith, in the late eighteenth century, attempted to differentiate necessary commodities from luxury ones for taxation purposes, he defined necessaries as “whatever the custom of the country renders it indecent for creditable people, even for the lowest order, to be without.” According to his observation, “custom has rendered leather shoes a necessary of life in England. The poorest creditable person of either sex would be ashamed to appear in public without them. In Scotland, custom has rendered them a necessary of life to the lowest order of men; but not to the same order of women, who may, without any discredit, walk about bare-footed” (Smith [1776] 1976, 399–400). It is a reasonable hypothesis that within the family, inequality with respect to the distribution of material resources between husband and wife, between sons and daughters, has not been limited to Scotland and the eighteenth century, nor to the lowest order of persons or to footwear.

To what extent can we expect gender inequalities in terms of material standards of living to remain in the rich industrialized countries? Since the mid-1980s, a large number of studies have focused on the intrafamily distribution of standards of living between husband and wife. The results are partly contradictory, but indicate that in the affluent western countries nonnegligible differences are likely to exist within nuclear families in terms of consumption and material
conditions of life (Brannen and Wilson 1987; Cantillon and Nolan 1998; Fritzell 1999; Haddad and Kanbur 1989; Jenkins 1991; Millar and Glendinning 1989; McLanahan, Sørensen, and Watson 1989; Pahl 1989; Ringen and Halpin 1997; Wooley and Marshall 1994). These differences are exacerbated through increasingly common marriage dissolutions. In the rich industrialized countries, however, while differences in material standards of living between husband and wife still can be found, the major gender inequalities in material terms are probably no longer likely to run within nuclear families. At the present time in these countries, to paraphrase Adam Smith, custom has rendered it indecent for a creditable husband to offer his wife a noticeably lower standard of consumption than his own, or to offer less to his daughters than to his sons. Major gender differences with respect to standards of living are, however, still found with regard to categories such as lone mothers, widows, and divorced women. Furthermore, in all countries we find varying degrees of gender-based earnings gaps as well as occupational segregation.

As noted above, however, in analyses of gender inequality in modern societies, we must consider not only material achievements but also inequalities with respect to agency as reflected in citizens’ capacities to achieve and in terms of the range of alternative achievements among which an actor has the capability to choose. During the past decades significant efforts have been made to widen the analysis of inequality by considering aspects reflecting agency, such as the scope of an individual’s action alternatives and control over resources enabling her to make choices. Thus Lazarsfeld and Thielens (1958, 254) proposed the concept of “effective scope” to reflect what an individual perceives, has contact with, and reaches for through her interests and expectations. In the late 1960s, the Swedish “Level of Living” surveys, pioneered by Johansson (1970, 1973), conceptualized well-being in terms of citizens’ control over resources enabling them to choose and to direct their own lives, and developed a set of indicators to measure its different components (for empirical analyses, see, e.g., Erikson and Åberg 1987).

Along similar lines of thought, Sen (1992) argues that when assessing individual well-being or the goodness of a social order, we must consider not only manifest but also latent or potential aspects of a person’s well-being. Sen assumes that freedom to choose is an important component of well-being and defines freedom in terms of “alternative sets of accomplishments that we have the power to achieve” (Sen 1992, 34). He uses the concept of functioning to describe a person’s accomplishments and regards achieved functionings as constituting a person’s well-being. According to Sen “the relevant functionings can vary from such elementary things as being ade-
quately nourished, being in good health, avoiding escapable morbidity and premature mortality, etc., to more complex achievements such as being happy, having self-respect, taking part in the life of the community, and so on" (Sen 1992, 39). Thus "the capability to achieve functionings (i.e., all the alternative combinations of functionings a person can choose to have) will constitute the person's freedom—the real opportunities—to have well-being" (Sen 1992, 40). In analysis of inequality with respect to gender as well as class, we should therefore consider not only material standards of living but also different aspects of agency reflecting the capability to achieve functionings, that is, the freedom to have well-being.

Feminist scholars have brought attention to blatant expressions of different types of gendered agency inequality with respect to civil rights long persisting in what now are affluent western countries (O'Connor 1993, 1996; Pateman 1988; Vogel 1991). The subordination of women to men was thus reflected in the traditional view of marriage as a political and economic union for the maintenance of order through the production of legitimate heirs to property. As long as the family, via marriage and inheritance, was a main channel for the transmission and control of property, economic control within the family rested almost exclusively with the husband. Through the institution of coverture, for centuries women lost basic parts of their civil rights when entering marriage. Women's access to higher education was limited, and marriage bars could prevent them from entering the civil service and some of the professions. In several western countries, such expressions of agency-relevant crude gender inequality remained until well after the end of World War II.

In the feminist critiques of mainstream analyses of inequality and welfare states, aspects of agency inequality have been stressed. Thus, for example, Young (1990, 37) argues that in the analysis of gender inequality we should consider citizens not only as possessors and consumers but also as active beings, "learning and using satisfying and expansive skills in socially recognized settings; participating in forming and running institutions, and receiving recognition for such participation; playing and communicating with others, and expressing our experience, feelings, and perspective on social life in contexts where others can listen." Aspects of agency inequality are implied when Hobson (1990) uses the concept of economic dependence to indicate the options of wives for exit and voice, that is, for leaving or staying in a relationship, and when Orloff (1993) takes the capacity to form an independent household as her criterion for gender inequality. Agency is also relevant when O'Connor (1993, 1996) and Lister (1997) use the concept of autonomy to reflect the consequences of welfare state policies.
One indisputable indicator of capability of achievement is life expectancy. Sen (1995, 16–20) has pointed at the dramatic variations in gender differences with respect to life expectancy in the contemporary world. In western Europe and North America, the considerably longer average life expectancy of women relative to men has generated a female: male population ratio of about 1.05. In major parts of Asia and North Africa, however, this population ratio is just about reversed. The major shortfall of women in the latter regions is likely to reflect gender bias in terms of health care, nutrition, education, and remunerative employment. In the rich western parts of the world, however, as indicated by the female: male population ratio, at the turn of the millennium the disadvantage of women in life expectancy has become history.

But if clad in furs and pearls and with an expectancy of a long life, would a housewife really have the same capability to choose from possible livings as her occupationally active husband? At the beginning of a millennium, what dimensions of agency can be assumed to remain most important for gender inequality in the rich western countries? In these discussions, feminist scholars have underlined the distribution of paid and unpaid work as a central variable. Another distinction is often drawn between, on the one hand, the public spheres of life, involving the state and markets and, on the other hand, the private sphere, central in which is the family. These debates have touched upon a wide range of issues. We will herein concentrate on three arenas in which gendered agency inequalities can be expected to be of central importance, that is, democratic politics, the educational system, and the labor force. In the political realm, decisions binding all citizens are made and here agency inequalities are likely to have major consequences for citizens. In the educational system, the cultural heritage is transmitted and credentials are acquired for use in competition in civil society as well as in the political sphere. In western societies, the labor force is a central arena where distributive processes take place. Agency inequality in terms of participation in these socioeconomic stratification processes is therefore of basic relevance in a wide range of contexts. An important question in this context is to what extent gender-related agency inequalities within these three arenas are “crystallized” in the sense that countries tend to have similar rankings with respect to inequality in all of them.

When discussing agency inequality, it is helpful to remember that here, as in analyses of material inequality, we can focus on a continuum with, at the bottom end, a basic level of agency inequality which can be called “agency poverty,” and at the top end, what can be seen as inequality at elite levels. Thus in the political sphere, a basic level
of agency inequality is reflected in the right to vote, whereas on the very elite levels, agency inequality refers to participation in parliaments and governments. Within the cultural-educational sphere, basic agency inequality is indicated by access to primary education; at elite levels by access to tertiary education. In a socioeconomic stratification perspective, differences in labor force participation rates indicate basic agency inequality, that is, agency poverty, whereas elite-level agency inequality is reflected, for example, in differential access to top decision-making positions. We will now turn to an analysis of the development and extent of elite-level gendered agency inequality in political representation and in tertiary education among our countries. Thereafter differences in agency poverty with respect to labor force participation will be considered.

Gendered Agency Inequality in Political Representation and Education

With the exception of Japan, in all our countries nearly universal and equal suffrage for men was a reality within a year after the end of World War I. For women, however, suffrage tended to occur later. In some European countries women achieved voting rights equal to those of men only after World War II: 1944 in France, 1945 in Italy, 1948 in Belgium, and 1971 in Switzerland (Table 1). The United Kingdom and Ireland introduced full female suffrage a decade later for women than for men.

Looking at elite-level agency differences in terms of representation in legislatures and governments, we can define a simple index of the equality gap, showing the percentage point difference between the share of women and men in different representative bodies. In Table 1, countries are ranked according to the size of this equality gap in 1998. The figures indicate that in all of our countries, at parliamentary and governmental levels women continue to be represented to a lesser extent than men. In 1950, the equality gap was, on average, 90 percentage points in our eighteen countries. Two decades later, in 1970, the average gap remained unchanged and had begun to decline only in a few countries, especially in Finland and Sweden. After 1970, however, we find an accelerating decrease in the equality gap, with the average declining to −64 percentage points in 1990 and to −50 percentage points in 1998. Thus the proportion of women in national legislatures increased from an average of 5% in 1970 to an average of 25% in 1998, at that time with a range of 9% in France and Japan to 43% in Sweden. Country differences in the equality gap with respect to government composition from 1991 to 1994 fol-
Table 1. Equality gap between women and men with respect to political representation in legislatures and governments and with respect to education in eighteen countries

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<td>France</td>
<td>1944</td>
<td>L/I</td>
<td>-88 -96 -88 -82 -74</td>
<td>-19 -1 -2 -2 -0.1</td>
<td>-90 -19 2 -7 -0.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>-92 -94 -88 -82 -74</td>
<td>-10 -19 0 -11 0.1</td>
<td>-80 -17 0 -19 0.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>-90 -94 -78 -80 -88</td>
<td>-72 -10 0 -19 0.1</td>
<td>-70 -28 -8 -23 0.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>-96 -96 -88 -80 -68</td>
<td>-72 -29 -8 -20 -0.2</td>
<td>-70 -28 -8 -23 0.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>1928</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>-92 -92 -84 -72 -80</td>
<td>-80 -17 0 -19 0.3</td>
<td>-70 -28 -8 -23 0.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>-92 -96 -80 -68 -70</td>
<td>-70 -29 -8 -20 -0.2</td>
<td>-70 -28 -8 -23 0.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1928</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>-94 -92 -84 -64 -88</td>
<td>-80 -17 0 -19 0.3</td>
<td>-70 -28 -8 -23 0.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>-100 -100 -74 -60 -88</td>
<td>-26 -14 -20 -1.0</td>
<td>-70 -28 -8 -23 0.1</td>
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<td>Canada</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>-98 -96 -72 -54 -66</td>
<td>-18 -17 0 -17 -0.2</td>
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<td>Country</td>
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<td>Austria</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>-92</td>
<td>-84</td>
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<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1902</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>-94</td>
<td>-98</td>
<td>-76</td>
<td>-48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>I+L</td>
<td>-88</td>
<td>-96</td>
<td>-72</td>
<td>-44</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>1893</td>
<td>I/L</td>
<td>-88</td>
<td>-90</td>
<td>-66</td>
<td>-42</td>
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<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>-92</td>
<td>-86</td>
<td>-58</td>
<td>-36</td>
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<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>1906</td>
<td>L+I</td>
<td>-82</td>
<td>-66</td>
<td>-22</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1913</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>-90</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1915</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>-80</td>
<td>-78</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>-86</td>
<td>-72</td>
<td>-24</td>
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<tr>
<td>Average</td>
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<td>-90</td>
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Equality gap = percentage point difference between women and men. Weighted average of both chambers where relevant.

*I = individual candidates; L = party lists.

Former German Federal Republic except for education 1994.
lows a pattern much like the one for parliaments, and is, on average, about as high as the parliamentary gap in 1990.\textsuperscript{11}

To the extent that the underrepresentation of women in legislatures reflects some degree of reluctance among citizens to vote for female candidates, the representation of women is likely to be affected by electoral systems. Of potential importance in this context is if votes are cast for individual candidates or for party lists with many candidates.\textsuperscript{12} Where votes are cast for individual candidates, the choice of each candidate may activate a potential reluctance to vote for women, something that is likely to influence not only voting but also party nomination of candidates. Given the level of reluctance to vote for women, an electoral system where voters choose among party lists of candidates is therefore likely to give a higher proportion of women nominated and elected, since parties can now compose mixed lists of candidates, lists that reflect the sentiments of voters in a more balanced way. Even with only a relatively small preference for men among voters, voting for individual candidates may thus generate processes similar to those described by Schelling (1978) in the context of racial segregation, processes which can result in large imbalances in the sex ratio among elected representatives.

The post-1970 decline in the equality gap would appear to provide some support for the hypothesis that electoral forms are of relevance for female representation in politics. This reduction has not been uniform among our countries but has instead greatly increased inter-country variation. Equality gaps have remained high in France, Japan, the United States, and Ireland, all countries with voting for individual candidates. On the other hand, the decline has been strongest in the four Nordic countries as well as in the Netherlands, all with party list voting. Italy, with list voting, has retained a very high gender gap, while Australia and Canada, with individual candidates, has decreased this gap considerably. In the Federal Republic of Germany, which during the postwar period has had a combination of list voting and candidate voting, more women have been elected via list voting. In Finland we find a different type of combination, where voters have to pick individual candidates within party lists. During the period considered here, France and New Zealand have changed their electoral systems. In the Fourth French Republic, list voting and proportional elections resulted in about the same low levels of female representation as in other countries at this time. After the introduction of single member election districts in the Fifth Republic, however, the gender gap in political representation has been preserved. In 1996, New Zealand had its first election with a proportional electoral system, something which may have accelerated its increase in female parliamentary representation.\textsuperscript{13}
In this context, however, differences between parties also appear to have played an important role. Thus in Europe, in the period between the two world wars, in spite of the tendencies for women to vote for conservative and especially confessional parties to a greater extent than for socialist ones, the parties on the left tended to elect a larger proportion of women to legislatures than did other parties (Tingsten 1937, chap. 1). In most European countries, this pattern has tended to continue (Norris 1987, chap. 6).\textsuperscript{14}

In the area of tertiary education, the gender equality gap shows major changes over time, however, from lower levels than those noted in elite-level political representation. Among cohorts born in the 1930s (55–64 years of age in 1994), equality gaps in the composition of university graduates were sizable, on average -17 percentage points in our countries. The largest gaps were found in the United Kingdom, Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, and Austria, whereas the lowest gaps appeared in Sweden, Denmark, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Norway, Finland, and the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{15} In the cohorts born in the 1960s (25–34 years of age in 1994), however, equality gaps have drastically decreased to an average of only 3 percentage points and are sizable primarily in Switzerland, Belgium, the United Kingdom, Austria, and Germany. Furthermore in the cohorts of the 1960s, in terms of the cumulated number of years of schooling, the equality gap is very small, showing a slight advantage to women, and with a substantial gap found only in Switzerland. When it comes to the composition of recent Ph.D.s (or equivalents), however, in 1994 large differences are still found, with an average equality gap of -17 percentage points. Here variations among countries are limited, with primarily France, Italy, Finland, and the United States deviating by having comparably low gaps. As is well known, gender inequalities also remain with respect to educational specialization, leading to differentially prestigious occupations.

An Agency-Related Typology of Gendered Policy Institutions

In debates on gendered agency inequality, it is necessary to recognize that behind the distinctions between paid and unpaid work, between the public and the private spheres, looms the fact that the labor force is the arena for the major socioeconomic stratification processes in modern societies, processes where agency is crucial. As many observers have noted, individuals who are excluded from participation in the labor force, among them traditionally many women, are disfavored in terms of material standards of living as well as social rights, which are claim rights typically conditioned on economic activity. In the debate on strategies to counteract this type of
gender inequality, a long-standing political issue has been whether
can should base their demands on difference from or equality
with men. In this difference versus equality debate, what has been
labeled "Wollstonecraft's dilemma" (Pateman 1988, 252) poses this
issue in terms of a choice between paid and unpaid work. Here the
traditional "difference" line of argument is that women's unpaid car-
ing work should form the base for their rights and position in society
in the same way as does men's paid work. Women's claims should
thus be based on criteria different from those of men. The alternative
"equality" line of argument favors policies which would enable
women to participate in the labor force on equal terms with men.
This equality strategy has been questioned, one major argument be-
ing that it would still leave women with the responsibility for the
major part of caring work within the family (e.g., Knijn 1994).

In this context it is fruitful to recognize the importance of the
choice between paid and unpaid work for gendered agency inequality
in the socioeconomic stratification process. Since the economic
sphere and the labor force constitute the main arenas within which
distributive processes are located and stratification takes place, par-
ticipation in the labor force does not only determine the distribution
of resources that form the basis for material inequality. Such partici-
pation is also likely to affect a person's self-perception, identity, and
effective scope in ways which may influence capabilities and freedom
in many different areas of life. Central in this context is, moreover,
that participation in the labor force is likely to affect interaction pat-
tterns and bargaining positions within the family. A changing distri-
bution of intrafamily bargaining power is likely to be a precondition
for changes in the distribution of caring work within the family. In
this context a transfer of caring work from the family to the labor
market is likely to be associated with important changes in intrafam-
ily bargaining power.

It would therefore appear that in contemporary western societies,
gender differences in terms of labor force participation constitute a
-crucial arena of gendered agency inequality. If, in Sen's terms, the
capability to choose and to achieve functionings constitute an indi-
vidual's freedom, agency inequality within the main processes of so-
cioeconomic stratification in the labor force is likely to be especially
important for gender inequality. To attempt to resolve Wollstone-
craft's dilemma by a difference strategy would involve policies to
"upgrade" unpaid caring work to the level of paid work, something
implying an effort to undo the effects of agency in basic socioeco-
nomic stratification processes. The historical evidence would appear,
however, to indicate that public policies can modify, but not basi-
cally change, patterns of material inequality generated in the stratifi-
cation process. Thus, for example, lone mothers and widows, the claims of whom for support from public authorities are based primarily on need, tend to end up with public benefits close to the poverty level. Typically only individuals with relatively high earnings can be helped via social insurance programs to maintain a relatively high standard of living. If we follow Hobson (1990) and Orloff (1993) in viewing the capacity to form an independent household as the criterion for gender inequality, it would appear that without labor force participation this capacity can only be marginally achieved.

In recent years, feminist scholars have argued that the equality-difference dichotomy is an unfortunate one (Fraser 1994; Lister 1997). Moving beyond this dichotomy would involve a use of policies focusing on gradually moving parts of care work from the family to the public sphere as well as to change the gender balance in the distribution of caring work within the family. In such a strategy, labor force participation is central. Via its consequences for bargaining positions within the family, increasing labor force participation among married women can potentially lead to changes in public policies as well as to a gradual deconstruction of traditional gender roles in the sharing of caring work.

To what extent do different types of welfare states shape the patterns of gendered agency inequalities in terms of participation in the main socioeconomic stratification processes as indicated by differences in labor force participation rates? To elucidate this question we need a gender-relevant typology of welfare states. Such typologies can be based on welfare state indicators which reflect causes, intervening variables, and/or effects. The seminal threefold distinction between "liberal," "conservative," and "social democratic" welfare state regimes proposed by Esping-Andersen (1990) attempts to capture the general features of these regimes on the basis of the pattern of correlations among a multidimensional set of indicators. Esping-Andersen’s typology thus spans from assumed causal factors to program characteristics and outcomes. It has proved very useful for descriptive purposes. By opening up new and imaginative perspectives in the comparative study of welfare states, it has stimulated much research. However, while such a "conglomerate" typology of broadly conceived regimes is useful for general descriptive purposes, the utility of a typology as an analytical tool in causal analyses can be increased if we base it on indicators restricted to reflect the structure of welfare state institutions. In this context institutions can be seen as "intervening variables" mediating between, on the one hand, assumed causal factors and, on the other hand, policy outcomes or effects. Furthermore, a focus on the structure of institutions improves our possibilities not only to describe welfare states and their changes...
in much more specific and precise ways, but also to test hypotheses about why countries differ and the consequences of these differences.

Scholars working on gender issues have pointed to a wide range of problems associated with Esping-Andersen’s typology, as well as with other mainstream welfare state typologies (Bussemaker and van Kersbergen 1994; Hobson 1991; Lewis 1992, 1997; Lewis and Ostner 1995; Orloff 1993; Sainsbury 1994, 1996; Shaver 1989). Many of the criticisms are interrelated by the fact that mainstream typologies do not directly address questions of gender-differentiated outcomes and do not predict women’s employment rates in different countries. The critics have thus highlighted the ways in which these typologies center around the state-market relationship and men’s paid work, while largely failing to bring unpaid work into the analysis. A related criticism has been that the typologies largely neglect the role of social services, which are of special relevance for gender inequality. The critics have therefore underlined the importance of including social policies and social service programs that are explicitly directed to families or to different categories of women and children.

As the critique against mainstream welfare state typologies indicates, it is unlikely that we will find any simple categorization of welfare states that is helpful in the analysis of gender inequality as well as class inequality. This difficulty may partly reflect that the effects of welfare states on patterns of inequality in terms of gender and class can be asymmetrical. A particular constellation of welfare state institutions thus need not promote similar relative levels of gender inequality or class inequality; instead it can support high gender inequality but low class inequality, or vice versa. A more fruitful approach therefore is to attempt to clarify differences and interactions between inequalities with respect to gender and class with the help of separate typologies and thereafter to attempt to combine them into institutional models relevant for gender as well as class inequalities.

In attempts to devise gender-sensitive typologies with indicators reflecting welfare state institutions, the question of the distribution of paid and unpaid work has been central. The concept of “the male breadwinner model” has been used to indicate the degree to which public policies presume that the husband is the dominant earner within a family (Lewis 1992, 1997). This concept is fruitful since it recognizes the central role of differences in labor force participation for gender inequality (Kolberg 1991; Lewis 1997; Taylor-Gooby 1991). As pointed out by Sainsbury (1996, 42–44), however, it is fruitful here to discuss relevant policies in multidimensional terms. In fact, Sainsbury doubts the meaningfulness of attempting to distin-
guish "families of nations" in terms of social policy models and would appear to prefer empirical examination of variation along a number of separate dimensions. Shaver and Bradshaw (1995) have explored the major problems associated with attempts to devise welfare state typologies relevant for women's unpaid work.

Yet it would not appear necessary here to abandon attempts at constructing a multidimensional typology of policies of relevance for gendered agency inequality in terms of labor force participation. In this context we must, however, consider a broad spectrum of welfare state policies. Furthermore, it is important to remember that the Wollstonecraft dilemma implies a two-dimensional policy conception in terms of presumptions of women's agency reflected in the relative stress on unpaid versus paid work. Here it is thus not enough that we bring in social services or other programs of special relevance for women and children. We must also consider the potential consequences of institutionalized policy models in terms of the horns of the Wollstonecraft dilemma: Does a policy support women's labor force participation or does it encourage their unpaid work at home?

We will outline here a theoretically based typology of broadly conceived policy institutions likely to be of major relevance for gendered agency inequality in terms of labor force participation. The policy institutions are selected so as to reflect the multiple ways in which public support to families is organized in a society. The focus here is on social rights, that is, on claim rights which citizens have in relation to central and local government. In this context the first choice faced by governments is whether to leave the formation of gendered agency inequality to markets and families or to develop public policies granting claim rights to citizens. In the latter case governments have a choice between two dimensions of social rights. One dimension reflects support to a dual earner family model encouraging women's labor force participation and the redistribution of social care work in society and within the family. The other dimension reflects general support to the nuclear family, presuming a traditional gendered division of labor in society as well as within the family. In such a two-dimensional space, we can describe policy differences in terms of their goals as well as in terms of their strength.

Variation in terms of institutional support for a dual earner family model indicates to what extent policy institutions have characteristics that encourage women's continuous labor force participation, enable parents, men as well as women, to combine parenthood with paid work, and attempt to redistribute caring work within the family. In identifying institutions for general family support, we will look at the extent to which public policies give support to the nuclear family, while having institutional characteristics presuming that or being
neutral to whether or not wives have the primary responsibility for caring and reproductive work within the family and only enter paid work on a temporary basis as secondary earners. Countries where none of the above two policy dimensions are well developed provide citizens with relatively few claim rights in this area. These countries can be assumed to have chosen to largely allow market forces to dominate the shaping of gender relations, leaving individuals to find private solutions within the context of their market resources and/or family relations. In the choice between politics and markets, such countries can therefore be described as having market-oriented gender relations policies. We can thus distinguish three broad ideal typical models of gendered welfare state institutions, that is, the models of general family support, dual-earner support, and market-oriented policies.

On the theoretical level, the above institutional models can capture central aspects of gender-relevant public policies, indicating differences in goals with respect to gender relations as well as the strength of policies. In this context it is necessary, however, to remember that institutions are always embedded in wider social contexts, including citizens’ attitudes, norms, and values, which may support or counteract policy outcomes. Furthermore, existing institutions reflect the combined effects of many different and often contradictory forces. We can therefore seldom expect a close overlap between ideal types and actually existing institutions. At best, typologies can give us a bird’s-eye view of the general contours of the landscape, thus facilitating orientation without giving guidance in details.

When attempting to operationalize the above policy dimensions, it is fruitful to focus on a broad array of legislation, including social insurance programs for parents and children, family-relevant taxation policies, and social services for children as well as the elderly, measures which are all likely to have gender-related agency effects. The touchstone for the selection and categorization of indicators is thus whether the institutional characteristics of a specific policy primarily contributes to the general support of the nuclear family, in particular one of the single-earner type, or whether it is likely to enable and promote married women’s paid work, a dual-earner family, and the redistribution of caring work within the family and at the societal level.

In comparative empirical work, it is, however, often difficult to find reliable and valid indicators for relevant aspects of policy dimensions. In this context, especially the quality of available information on day care services for preschool children is problematic. From the point of view of enabling dual-earner families, day care services
should ideally cover full days and whole working weeks for infants and children up to school age. Unfortunately, however, to an extent not fully realized in previous research in this area, now available data on day care are not fully comparable in terms of the duration and hours of care. For most continental European countries available figures typically indicate very high service levels for children 3 years and older, but very low ones for children 0–2 years of age. However, in most of these countries, day care has traditionally been organized primarily for somewhat older preschool children and on a part-time basis, intended only to complement caring work within the family. Thus, for example, many day care units provide only half-day care, are closed on Wednesdays, and do not offer lunches for the children, thus presuming the presence of a mother at home. Furthermore, it is not always clear if available figures represent percentages of children actually attending or children with the right to claim services. In other countries, such as the Nordic ones, day care services were largely developed to enable mothers' employment, and are typically provided on a full day, full week basis. These comparability problems are likely to be most serious with respect to day care services for somewhat older preschool children. We will therefore take figures for day care services for children 3 years and older as indicators of general family support, while only data on day care services for the 0- to 2-year-old category are used as indicators of dual-earner policies.

As measures of general family support we will use three indicators:

1. **Cash child allowances** to minor children (expressed as a percentage of the net average wage of a single worker with an average wage of industrial workers in the country during the relevant year).

2. **Family tax benefits** to minor children and to an economically nonactive spouse (defined as the difference in the net post-tax earnings between, on the one hand, a single person and, on the other hand, a four-person family with two minor children and only one of the spouses economically active; this difference being expressed as a percentage of the net average wage of a single worker).

3. **Public day care services for somewhat older children** (from 3 years up to school age, reflecting places available in relation to the number of children in the relevant age group).

Cash benefits to minor children is a form of general family support, neutral with respect to the labor force participation of the spouses. Family tax benefits, given via tax allowances or tax credits, are another form of general family support. Among the family tax
benefits, those directed to housewives can be expected to encourage homemaking.\textsuperscript{24}

With respect to \textit{dual-earner support}, a basic question is to what extent public polices attempt to shift care work from the unpaid to the paid sector (i.e., from the family to the labor market) as well as within the family, thereby making it possible for wives to maintain a major and continuous occupational commitment. Central here are facilities for care of the youngest preschool children on a continuous basis.\textsuperscript{25} This is indicated by the provision of day care for children 0–2 years of age. In terms of economic support, an important role is played by policies for earnings-related maternity leave, programs which encourage young women to start and to maintain an occupational career while enabling them to have an interlude for the care of infants.\textsuperscript{26} In a few countries, paternal leave programs provide fathers with the possibility for a period of earnings-related paid leave.\textsuperscript{27} Such paternal leave programs are the only available comparable indicators of direct relevance for policies to change caring roles within the nuclear family. Also significant here are policies supplying public care to the elderly to enable them to maintain their own independent households, thereby decreasing the reliance on care by daughters and daughters-in-law.

We have thus selected four variables as indicators of the degree of \textit{dual-earner support}:

1. Public day care services for the youngest children (0–2 years of age, indicating places available in relation to the number of children in the relevant age groups).
2. Paid maternity leave (a multiplicative variable reflecting the percentage of replacement of previous earnings, duration of benefit, and coverage in the relevant population).
3. Paid paternity leave (an ordinal variable indicating generosity of paid leave to fathers of minor children).\textsuperscript{28}
4. Public home help to the elderly (proportion of persons 65 years or older receiving services to help them to continue living at home).

Because of the need to compare a large number of different types of indicators, the following analyses will focus on averages for the years 1985 and 1990. Indicators of general family support and dual-earner support have been collected from different sources (cf. Methodological Appendix). In the index of general family support, each indicator has been given the same weight. In the index for dual-earner support, however, reflecting their assumed greater importance, measures of day care services for the youngest children and of maternity leave have been given a weight twice that of home help to
the elderly and paternity leave. In view of the problems of reliability and validity in available data, the resulting figures are treated as ordinal scales. Furthermore, in assigning countries to categories of policy models, we will to some extent utilize qualitative information on the separate indicators.  

The rank orders of countries in terms of general family support and dual-earner support indicate that on both these policy dimensions the lowest values are found in a category that includes Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States (Table 2). These seven countries can therefore be described as having a market-oriented gender policy model. In some of these countries, such as the United States and Canada, citizens have come to largely rely on their market resources for the supply of caring services; in countries such as the United Kingdom, informal help organized via family relationships plays a greater role in this context. Among the remaining eleven countries, we find intermediate to high levels of general family support as well as dual-earner support. This is not surprising, remembering that general family support includes variables such as cash child allowances, which are neu-

<table>
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<tr>
<th>General family support</th>
<th>Dual-earner support</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Belgium</td>
<td>1. Sweden</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Germany</td>
<td>2. Denmark</td>
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<td>3. France</td>
<td>3. Finland</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Italy</td>
<td>5. France</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Austria</td>
<td>6. Belgium</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Denmark</td>
<td>7. Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Ireland</td>
<td>8. Italy</td>
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<tr>
<td>10. Finland</td>
<td>10. Austria</td>
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<tr>
<td>11. Netherlands</td>
<td>11. Ireland</td>
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<td>12. United Kingdom</td>
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<td>13. United Kingdom</td>
<td>13. Canada</td>
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<tr>
<td>14. Switzerland</td>
<td>14. Japan</td>
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<tr>
<td>15. Japan</td>
<td>15. Australia</td>
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<td>16. Australia</td>
<td>16. Switzerland</td>
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<td>17. New Zealand</td>
<td>17. United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>18. United States</td>
<td>18. New Zealand</td>
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tral with respect to female labor force participation. On the indicators constituting the dual-earner dimension, countries appear to be highly skewed and only Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Norway can be reasonably described as having made major moves toward a dual-earner support model. With relatively low levels of day care for the smallest children, Norway, with equal ranks on both dimensions, is more similar to Denmark, Finland, and Sweden in terms of maternity leave, paternity leave, and home help to the elderly than with the remaining countries. In the category of general family support we have Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Austria, Ireland, and The Netherlands. Among them, France and Belgium score relatively high in terms of dual-earner support and could be described as combining a general family support model with a weak version of the dual-earner model.

As discussed above, the present typology is based on social rights in the form of claim rights. Public policies of relevance for gendered agency inequality can also be based on civil rights, that is, rights in the form of liberties where the capacities of citizens to claim these rights need not be supported by public policies. In some of our countries, where social rights are less well developed, the extension of civil rights via courts and legislation outlawing gender discrimination in employment and pay have been of importance for women's position in the labor market. This has been the case, for example, in the United States since the 1960s. Since the 1970s, the European court has been of significance for gender inequality on the labor market in several European countries. The relationships between liberties and claim rights in these areas is, however, largely unexplored and cannot be dealt with here. 31

Political Tendencies and Gender Policy Models

What have been the main driving forces behind the attempts to develop gender relations policies of the three types we have outlined above? As noted above, among the major actors on this scene we can expect to find not only political parties but also churches and women's movements, working outside or within political parties. In recent decades the role of political parties has been challenged by new social movements. In many countries women's movements have been important in changing public attitudes and values and in bringing up gender issues to the top of the political agenda. Yet in the countries considered here women have not formed feminist political parties; in recent decades they have instead chosen to attempt to affect the policies of already established parties from the outside or from the inside. In the formation of public policies and legislation of
relevance for gender inequality, political parties thus continue to occupy key roles. As is well known, among parties in the western countries it has traditionally been possible to discern two different but partly related dimensions. One is the left-right dimension, revolving around issues broadly related to class inequality and political interventions into markets to affect such inequalities, a dimension along which conservative, centrist, and left parties can be roughly located. Especially in continental Europe, however, this left-right continuum has been markedly modified by confessional parties, most of them related to Catholicism, but some also to Protestantism. Claiming to constitute an alternative to capitalism as well as to socialism, confessional parties have attempted to situate themselves in intermediate positions on the center-right section of the political continuum, and have been especially concerned with counteracting poverty. Central in their world view have been religiously motivated concerns for maintaining the traditional family as the moral basis for a good society.

In the formation of ideologies and norms related to the family, the Catholic Church as well as the different Protestant churches have long been major forces. As is well known, the ideal of a family with a *pater familias* as its head and a mother devoted to the home thus has long traditions within the Catholic Church. In the late nineteenth century, in the very influential “Workers’ Encyclical,” Pope Leo XIII (1943 [1891], paragraphs 20 and 60) maintained that “it is a most sacred law of nature that the father of a family see that his offspring are provided with all the necessities of life,” and saw women as “intended by nature for the work of the home—work indeed which especially protects modesty in women and accords by nature with the education of children and the well-being of the family.” At the fortieth anniversary of this encyclical, Pope Pius XI (1943 [H1931H], paragraph 71) stated: “Mothers, concentrating on household duties, should work primarily in the home or in its immediate vicinity.” At its eightieth anniversary, while recommending an end to the unjust discrimination of women and equal rights for the sexes, Pope Paul VI (1971, paragraph 19) warned against “the misinterpreted equality which denies the differences God himself has created and that deny the woman’s special and especially important role in the heart of the family and society.”

While the various Protestant churches and denominations have long shared similar traditional ideals of family life, in terms of policy influences they have been much less effective than the Catholic Church, which has worked more or less closely with confessional parties. Furthermore, during the last few decades of the twentieth century Protestant churches appear to have softened their positions
on women's roles to a greater extent than has the Catholic Church. This is indicated, for example, by the fact that an increasing number of Protestant churches are accepting women into the clergy. With only some exceptions, during the last quarter of the twentieth century Protestant churches have played a comparatively limited role in the political life of western countries.

The policy impact of the norms favored by the churches can be expected to largely depend on the extent to which churches have worked together with confessional political parties. In the analysis of gender policies, confessional parties therefore have a special role that differentiates them from secular conservative-centrist parties. Among the latter, a few can be described as anticlerical, but all of them have generally been in favor of limiting policy interventions into markets. Some of these secular conservative-centrist parties have supported policies strengthening the traditional family model in order to counteract falling birth rates, which is seen as a threat to the military and economic capacity of a nation (Koven and Michel 1995; Pedersen 1993; Wennemo 1994). In recent decades, however, in some countries liberal parties have come to support policies of gender equality. While left parties have opposed confessional parties, they have generally opted for political interventions to counteract class inequality. During the last three decades of the twentieth century, primarily in western Europe, some of the left parties have gradually come to support the dual-earner model. In this process, at least in some countries, women's movements associated with left parties appear to have played a significant role (Hobson and Lindholm 1997).34

In analyzing the role of political parties for the formation of gender policy models at the end of the twentieth century, it therefore appears fruitful to make a distinction between three major political tendencies, that is, confessional parties, secular conservative-centrist parties, and left parties (cf. Methodological Appendix). Our hypothesis thus is that confessional parties have tended to support social norms, values, and policies favoring the traditional family type and general family support. To varying extents, secular parties may have supported similar policies originating in middle-class ideals of "separate spheres" for men and women (Reskin and Padavic 1994). However, during the last decades of the twentieth century, some of the left parties have gradually come to support the dual-earner family model. In this context, secular conservative-centrist parties are expected largely to have favored noninterventionism and market solutions, although among some of them we also find pronatalist streams of thought. The outcomes of the efforts of these actors have often been compromises and combinations of overlaid but partly different types of gender policies.
To leave a lasting impression on policy structures, a party usually has to be in government position for a relatively long time and, in the case of coalition governments often found in countries with proportional elections, have a relatively strong position within the coalition. If holding the balance of power in a coalition government, however, also relatively small parties may exert an influence on their top priority issues, which for the small confessional parties typically have concerned family policy. To analyze the role of the different types of political tendencies for gender-relevant policy formation, it is therefore fruitful to focus on the composition of governments in terms of the relative strength of parties, but also to consider the length of time a political tendency has been represented in government. To get a simple description of the relative role played by different political tendencies during the postwar period, we will therefore look at two separate but related indicators: the percentage of government portfolios held as well as the percentage of time that a party or political tendency has been represented in governments. For simplicity, the average of these two government power variables is taken as an indicator of policy influence potential.

According to the above combined indicator, the relative strength of the three political tendencies during the period 1946–1985 has a marked relationship with the gender policy models found in our eighteen countries from 1985 to 1990 (Table 3). In eight continental European countries—Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Austria, and France—ranked here in terms of decreasing confessional party influence potential, the general family support model has come to dominate in all but one country. The exception here is Switzerland, which has market-oriented gender policy institutions. In Canada, the United States, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, ranked in terms of decreasing conservative-centrist influence potential, confessional parties have been absent and left-party influence relatively limited. All of them have market-oriented gender policy models. In Finland, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, however, where left parties have had a relatively strong influence potential, we find a dominance for the dual-earner policy model.

As noted above, any attempt to fit comparative typologies and developmental patterns to existing realities in a larger number of countries is bound to be confronted with exceptions and apparent anomalies. Such exceptions and deviations from expectations provide interesting cases for the analysis of specific factors contributing to national trajectories in the development of institutions and policy outcomes. In discussing these exceptions, we run the risk of stressing specific attributes in each country, thus arriving at a seemingly full

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Confessional</th>
<th>Conservative-centrist</th>
<th>Left</th>
<th>Gender policy institutions</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>55</td>
<td>Market oriented</td>
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<tr>
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<td>55</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>37</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>77</td>
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<td>Japan</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>Dual earner</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Average, 1946–1985, of percent of government seats and percent of time in government.

but yet unsystematic explanation of intercountry patterns of differences. In comparative analysis with a limited number of countries, all with their separate characteristics and specific histories, it would appear fruitful to point at constellations of factors which are likely to be of importance, constellations which can serve as hypotheses for further research.

The most obvious exception to our hypothesis about the relationships between the relative strength of different political tendencies
and gender policy models is Switzerland. During the period in question here, religiously and linguistically split Switzerland has had an almost permanent coalition government with all three political tendencies represented. Furthermore, much of policy making takes place at the cantonal level, while it is severely circumscribed at the federal level, partly by the frequent use of referenda. Therefore the Swiss confederate policy-making structure has traditionally inhibited policy interventionism in most areas, including social policy (Huber, Ragin, and Stephens 1993; Immergut 1992), thus setting the stage for market-oriented policy options.

Although centrist-conservative parties have dominated governments in postwar Finland, the relatively strong left, albeit split between Communists and Social Democrats, has been represented via the Social Democratic Party in long-term coalition governments with the centrist parties. Such a position may have given better opportunities for influencing policy structures than have the relatively short-term Labour majority governments found in Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. The extent of left government influence potential would thus appear to show a threshold effect, resulting in a dual-earner model only in the four Nordic countries, where left parties have had a comparatively long incumbency coupled with strong electoral support.

As indicated in Table 2, France, with a general family support model, and Norway, with a dual-earner model, appear to be relatively close to each other in terms of their overall gender policy positions. This relative similarity is likely to partly reflect the fact that France is the continental European country where the position of the Catholic confessional party has been weakest, whereas Norway is the Protestant country where a Lutheran confessional party has the longest tradition and the strongest government presence. In France, since the Revolution of 1789 and the ensuing struggles about the reestablishment of the monarchy, during the nineteenth century the tensions between the Church and anticlerical, republican bourgeoisie forces were very strong. The confessional Catholic party was established relatively late and was gradually dissolved in the mid-1960s. The confessional policy pressure has thus not been consistent or stable over a longer time. However, as is well known, in France pronatalist policies have long traditions (Pedersen 1993). In Norway, a Lutheran confessional party was founded already in the 1930s and has had relatively long-term incumbency as a key participant in centrist-conservative coalition governments. This suggests the hypothesis that in these coalitions the Norwegian Christian People's Party may have played a significant role for family and gender relations policy.
Gender Policy Institutions and Gendered Agency Poverty

In the long term, women's labor force participation rates have varied between socioeconomic classes (Reskin and Padavic 1994). Since the 1950s, however, in the industrialized countries, the female labor force as a percentage of the total female population (16–64 years) has shown quite a strong average increase, yet with clear variations between countries. These variations reflect a number of different factors, such as the extent to which a labor shortage during the postwar "Golden Age" of rapid economic growth could be filled from labor reserves in agriculture, among housewives, or by immigration. During the same period, male labor force rates have tended to decrease to some extent, a significant factor here being the squeezing out of elderly persons from the labor force during the period of slackening economic growth after the early 1970s. This means that gender differences in agency poverty indicated by the percentage outside the labor force have narrowed markedly (Figure 1). However, important

![Figure 1. Average Difference in Labour Force Participation Rates Between Men and Women (15–64 years) in 18 Countries 1960–1995*](http://sp.oxfordjournals.org/)

*Labour force as a percentage of population 15-64 years.

Source: OECD Historical Statistics
variations remain; in fact, absolute differences between countries have been just about stable.\textsuperscript{40}

In analyzing the role of gender policy institutions for intercountry differences in gendered agency poverty, we will concentrate on differences between women and men aged 25–54 years in the percentage being outside the labor force.\textsuperscript{41} By focusing on female-male differences, we can eliminate some of the artificial variation among countries created by sometimes shifting definitions in labor force surveys and by other factors affecting registered participation rates. Furthermore, by concentrating on this age category we exclude the youngest and the oldest cohorts among which intercountry differences in rates of higher education and early labor force exit are greatest. Limitations in the availability of data on gender policy institutions leads us to look at the years in the middle of the 1980s to 1990.

The analysis is focused on female-male differences in three demographic categories. The first one refers to overall differences in percentages outside the labor force between women and men 25–54 years of age, and is an average for 1983 and 1990. In the second category, we introduce marital status and focus on differences between married women and married men 25–49 years of age around 1990. The third category introduces motherhood and involves differences between, on the one hand, mothers 25–39 years of age with at least one child of preschool age and, on the other hand, men in the same age group.\textsuperscript{42} Because of the lack of fully comparable data, the latter two categories will not comprise exactly the same age categories or exactly the same years in all countries (see Methodological Appendix). Within the labor force there are significant gender differences in terms of conditions for employment, work, and remuneration. Here we look at only one of these aspects, the differences between women and men in the proportion with marginal job attachment and precarious jobs.

Societal forces that have generated different types of gendered policy institutions can also be assumed to have contributed to mold social norms, attitudes, and values in similar directions. Such combinations of effects from institutions, norms, and attitudes lead us to expect that the largest gendered differences in agency poverty rates, indicated by the female-male difference in the percentages outside the labor force, are found in countries with a general family support model keyed to maintenance of the traditional family. The lowest degree of inequality is expected in countries with a dual-earner model encouraging women's employment. Countries with a market-oriented policy can here be expected to fall somewhere in between. In some of them, economic pressures on households may tend to be especially effective in making women accept market work.
The range of variation in the overall gendered differences in agency poverty rates in our eighteen countries is very large, with almost a 50 percentage point difference between Ireland and Sweden (Table 4). We are primarily interested in the size of the overall differences among countries with different gender policy institutions rather than in variations within these models. Thus in terms of the size of overall differences in agency poverty rates between women and men ages 25–54 years, we would expect the seven countries with general family support institutions to rank 1–7, the seven market-oriented countries to rank 8–14, and the dual-earner countries to rank 15–18. On the whole these expectations are born out. Some exceptions can, however, be noted. Market-oriented gender policy in Japan and Australia is thus associated with a higher overall level of gender differences than we find in France, Austria, and Germany with a general family support model. Austria, with a general family support model, would appear to have gender differences of the same size as Switzerland, with a market-oriented policy model. Moreover, gender differences in France, with a general family support model, are of about the same size as in the United Kingdom, with a market-oriented model. As expected, the lowest gender differences are found in countries with a dual-earner policy model. Among them, however, Norway has a larger difference than the others.

Introducing marital status and looking at differences in agency poverty between married women and married men, we find very much the same pattern as in the overall comparisons. The lowest gender differences are again found among countries with dual-earner support institutions, followed by countries with the market-oriented model, whereas, with only one exception, the highest rates are found in countries with the general family support model. The exception is again Australia, which in spite of its market-oriented gender policy model has a relatively high gender inequality, higher than in France.

Whereas marital status thus does not appear to have a major impact on patterns of gendered agency poverty among our countries, the presence of preschool children introduces more variation. Five of the seven countries with the general family support model—Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, Germany, and Austria—have high levels of gendered differences. About the same level of differences are however also found in Australia, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand, countries with market-oriented models. Furthermore, Belgium and France, with a general family support model, have relatively low gender differences. This may partly reflect their relatively high ranking in terms of dual-earner support. Again, however, the lowest level of gendered differences are found among the four countries with dual-earner institutions.
It goes without saying that while exclusion from the labor force can be seen as an important indicator of agency poverty, among persons in the labor force we find great variations with respect to significant job characteristics. Here we can only consider one aspect of these differences, that is, very short working hours indicating marginal job attachment and precarious employment. In several countries, persons working short hours are excluded from social security benefits, which can be claimed only by those working a minimum number of hours. Furthermore, persons with short working hours are more likely than others to have insecure employment conditions. Reflecting their preferences and/or the difficulties of developing occupational identities in marginal jobs, they may also be more likely to view their work in instrumental terms, as primarily a means toward a marginal increase in household income. To work only short hours may thus not be of great importance in terms of agency poverty.

The difference between women and men in the percentage normally working short hours (1–20 hours/week) expressed as a percentage of the population 15–64 years of age is positive in all countries for which we have data. These differences are largest in the United Kingdom, Norway, and The Netherlands, and sizable also in Australia, Belgium, and Germany.

Attitudes to women’s employment in a country are likely to influence women’s labor force participation rates. Based on surveys carried out in 1994 within the framework of the International Social Survey Program, we can compare attitudes to women’s work in thirteen of our countries. Here we will utilize a set of nine items covering different aspects of attitudes toward women’s employment:

1. A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work.
2. A preschool child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works.
3. All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job.
4. A job is alright, but what most women really want is a home and children.
5. Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay.
6. Both the man and woman should contribute to the household income.
7. A man’s job is to earn money; a woman’s job is to look after home and family.
8. Do you think that a woman should work outside the home when there is a child under school age?
9. Do you think that a woman should work outside the home after the youngest child starts school?
Table 4. Gender policy models and gender differences in "agency poverty" with respect to being outside the labor force or having marginal job attachment, and negative attitudes to women's employment by age in eighteen countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Gender policy model</th>
<th>Outside labor force</th>
<th>Marginal job attachment</th>
<th>Negative attitudes toward women's employment (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Women-men&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Men-men&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Women-men&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt; (married)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>General family support</td>
<td>55 (1)</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>General family support</td>
<td>46 (2)</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>General family support</td>
<td>43 (3)</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>General family support</td>
<td>36 (4)</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>General family support</td>
<td>32 (7)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>General family support</td>
<td>(30) (8)</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>General family support</td>
<td>26 (10)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Market oriented</td>
<td>36 (5)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Market oriented</td>
<td>34 (6)</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Market oriented</td>
<td>(30) (9)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> Gender differences (percentage points) with respect to marriage
<sup>b</sup> Married women minus men
<sup>c</sup> Married men minus women
<sup>d</sup> Single mothers minus married mothers
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>System Description</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Market oriented</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>(11)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Market oriented</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>(12)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Market oriented</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>(13)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Market oriented</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Dual-earner support</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>(15)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Dual-earner support</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>(16)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Dual-earner support</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Dual-earner support</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>(18)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


• Persons about 25–49 years, ca. 1990.

• Persons about 25–39 years, mothers with at least one preschool child, ca. 1990.

• Persons working short hours (<20 hours/week) as percent of population 15–64 years, average 1985 and 1994.

• Average percentage choosing negative alternatives in responses to nine attitude questions among men and women 1994.
Since we are concerned here with the role of attitudes for women remaining outside the labor force, we will focus on negative attitudes toward women's employment and attitudes of men as well as of women can be expected to be of relevance for women's choice. The average percentage with negative attitudes on these nine items in each country are differentiated here by age, one age category (25–54 years) being the same as in our analyses of labor force data and the other an older generation (55–76 years).

The distribution of negative attitudes shows a fair degree of patterning according to models of gender policy and also considerable agreement with gender differences in the percentage outside the labor force. Looking first at the older generation, we find high levels of negative attitudes in countries with a general family support model, that is, in Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, Germany, and France. Almost equally high levels are also found in Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, countries with market-oriented gender policies. In Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, negative attitudes in the older generation are at a lower level than in the general family support countries. In Norway, however, with a relatively marginal position in terms of its dual-earner support model, attitudes toward women's work are markedly negative in the older generation, whereas the negative level is lowest in Sweden.

Differences between older and younger cohorts partly reflect changes over time and show a clear decrease in negative attitudes. The greatest percentage point drop appears in Norway followed by Ireland, Austria, The Netherlands, and Germany. The smallest declines are found in Japan (from a high level) and in Sweden (from a low level). As a result, in the younger generation high average levels of negative attitudes toward women's employment still tend to be found in countries with a general family support model. Here, however, The Netherlands is an exception, with relatively low levels. Among countries with market-oriented models, relatively high levels of negative attitudes continue to be found in Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, while the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada have lower levels. As a result of changes in attitudes, Norway now has the third lowest level of negative attitudes, while Sweden continues with the lowest.

Markedly negative attitudes toward married women's work probably contribute to gender differences in agency poverty in Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, where these differences, especially in the presence of minor children, are unexpectedly high given the market-oriented gender policy models in these countries. With a very large agricultural sector in the years following World War II, Japan started with a relatively high female labor force participation rate,
which since then has remained largely stable during the period of later industrialization. The relatively high gender differences in Australia may partly reflect this country’s strong reliance on immigration as a source of labor during the period after World War II. The Netherlands has a long history of very large gender differences in labor force participation rates, and in spite of a marked decline in negative attitudes, these differences remain at a comparatively high level. In Norway, however, the drastic decline in negative attitudes has been accompanied by a marked decrease in gendered agency poverty with respect to labor force participation, but it still remains higher than in the other three countries with a dual-earner support policy model.

Earlier research has described Germany and the United Kingdom as having strong versions of the male breadwinner model, and France a medium strong one (Lewis 1992; Lewis and Ostner 1995). The analysis here partly modifies these interpretations. In terms of the present typology, Germany clearly has a general family support model, while in France this model is combined with a weak version of the dual-earner support model and the United Kingdom is characterized by a market-oriented one. With respect to gendered differences in being outside the labor force, Germany clearly differs from the United Kingdom, but also from France. The latter two countries are relatively similar except when it comes to mothers with preschool children and differences in marginal job attachment. In the United Kingdom, mothers of preschool children participate less in the labor force than in France. Furthermore, British women are much more often in marginal jobs than women in the other two countries. In contrast to France, where day care services are relatively well developed, the market-oriented model in the United Kingdom is combined with a reliance on kinship relations for caring work. Attitudes toward women’s employment are not more negative in the United Kingdom than in the United States, and much less negative than in Germany.

Class Inequality and Types of Social Insurance Institutions

What differences do we find among our eighteen countries in terms of class inequalities in material standards of living, and which is the role of welfare states in this context? We must confine the examination of these questions to the distribution of household income. Again, we will use ideal types of welfare state institutions as a heuristic tool in an attempt to explain and understand the patterning of income inequalities. Viewing institutions as intervening variables mediating the effect of causal factors on distributive outcomes, Korpi and Palme (1998) have developed a typology of social insur-
ance institutions based on the institutional structures of the major social insurance programs.\textsuperscript{53} This typology is keyed to three different aspects of social insurance institutions: criteria for benefit eligibility, principles used for determining benefit levels, and structures for governing social insurance institutions. It involves five ideal types of social insurance institutions. In our countries in the late 1980s, four of these models are relevant, that is, the targeted, the state corporatist, the basic security, and the encompassing models.\textsuperscript{54}

The targeted model, going back to the old poor laws, gives minimum or flat-rate benefits on the basis of need assessed via a means test. While traditionally this model has been important in most countries, in the late 1980s it is dominant only in Australia, where old age pensions as well as sickness insurance are means tested, presently however at relatively generous levels.\textsuperscript{55} The state corporatist model, originally introduced by Bismarck in Germany, covers, in principle, only economically active citizens (thereby excluding categories such as housewives).\textsuperscript{56} It involves separate insurance programs for different occupational categories such as manual workers, salaried employees, farmers, and the self-employed, each category having different contributions, conditions, and benefits. Eligibility for benefits is thus based on belonging to a specific occupational category; benefits are clearly earnings related and are financed largely by contributions from the insured and employers. In contrast to the other three models, state corporatist insurance institutions are governed by elected representatives for the insured and employers. This type of state corporatist insurance institutions are now dominant in Germany, Austria, Italy, France, Belgium, and Japan.

Another widespread model of social insurance institutions is the basic security model, focused on providing benefits on a flat rate or with only a very modest relation to previous earnings. Eligibility is based alternatively on citizenship or on individual payment of contributions. Thus Denmark, The Netherlands, Switzerland, Canada, and New Zealand have a basic security model where all citizens are eligible, while the basic security model in the United Kingdom, Ireland, and the United States requires contributions by the insured. In contrast to the state corporatist model, however, all insured here are found within the same program. Combining the earnings-related benefits of the state corporatist model with the universality of the basic security model, the encompassing model has been introduced in Sweden, Norway, and Finland. Here all citizens are insured within the same structure of programs, with flat rate benefits to everybody and, in addition, markedly earnings-related benefits to those who are economically active.

These different models of social insurance institutions receive their
sociopolitical significance partly because they organize citizens into differing configurations in terms of the distribution of risks and resources, and partly because they involve different degrees of political interventions into market distributive processes (Korpi and Palme 1998). As a result of the patterns into which institutions organize citizens with differing risks and resources, they are likely to influence the formation of citizens' interests, identities, and patterns of collective action. By taking from all taxpayers but giving only to those in need, the targeted model tends to drive a wedge between the short-term interests of, on the one hand, the poor and, on the other hand, the better-off workers as well as the middle class, that is, all those who have to pay taxes but receive little in return. In bringing together citizens into occupational categories that are relatively homogeneous in terms of risks and resources, the state corporatist model restricts redistribution to similarly positioned individuals, and thereby comes to underscore and highlight differences of interests among occupational categories. The basic security model is universal and covers all insured within the same program. However, it provides only flat rate and usually low levels of benefits, giving a minimum standard sufficient only for manual workers. Therefore, the basic security models encourage better-off citizens to safeguard their accustomed standards of living via occupational or private insurance and savings, thus creating a split of interests between, on the one hand, manual workers relying on public programs and, on the other hand, salaried employees and the middle classes, for which private forms of insurance come to loom large. The encompassing model combines the clearly earnings-related benefits of the state corporatist model with the universalism of the basic security model. By providing basic security benefits to all citizens, as well as markedly earnings-related benefits to all economically active individuals within the structure of the same social insurance programs, the encompassing model can come to downplay cleavages among citizens reflecting socioeconomic status. The encompassing model can therefore help to unify the formation of interests and identities among relatively heterogeneous occupational categories.

In terms of the degree of political interventionism into market distributive processes, reflected for example in the size of budgets available for redistribution, the targeted model as well as the basic security model clearly have a low reach, and are therefore expected to be associated with relatively high levels of inequality and poverty. In contrast, the encompassing model involves very considerable interventions into market distribution and can be expected to generate comparatively low levels of inequality and poverty. The state corporatist model with markedly earnings-related benefits is redistributive,
but this redistribution largely takes place within the separate occupational communities. In terms of degrees of inequality and poverty, the state corporatist model can thus be expected to fall somewhere in between, on the one hand, the targeted and basic security models and, on the other hand, the encompassing model. Again we must remember that institutions should be seen as embedded in wider social structures, which may support or counteract institutional effects. Furthermore, as discussed above, in view of the manifold factors affecting the distribution of income in western countries, no theoretically based welfare state typology can be expected to show more than a partial fit with hypotheses on patterns of distribution and inequality.

To elucidate the above hypotheses on the association of social insurance institutions and class inequality, we will look at differences among countries in terms of the degree of income inequality and poverty among different categories of citizens. The analyses use the Luxembourg Income Study, a database that has greatly improved our possibilities for comparisons of income distributions. Extending the analysis of Korpi and Palme (1998), here we will use information available for fifteen of our eighteen countries (cf. Methodological Appendix). We begin by looking at inequality in the distribution of disposable household income, that is, after deductions of taxes and social security contributions, but with the addition of transfers. An equivalence scale is applied to take account of economies of scale within households of different size. As measures of the inequality of income distribution, we use the Gini coefficient and the percentile ratio (between the ninetieth and the tenth percentiles, P90/P10). Individuals with a disposable income less than 50% of the median are defined as poor. Here we will look at income distribution and poverty in the total population (20 years and older) as well as among those in the prime working ages (25–59 years). Poverty rates will also be studied in the total population, and the prime working ages, as well as in three especially vulnerable categories: the elderly (65+ years), children, and single mothers.

Figures on income inequality and poverty in the fifteen countries are given in Table 5. For each country we have eight combinations of different indicators and population categories. To facilitate an overview of these seven indicators, the countries have been ranked according to each of them and the averages of these ranks are given in the table. Focusing again on the relative size of differences between countries having different institutional types, in terms of the hypothesis above, going from the highest to the lowest inequality, we would expect the targeted and basic security countries to have ranks 1–8, the four countries with the state corporatist model to have ranks
Table 5. Inequality in disposable household income and poverty in fifteen countries in different population categories by type of social insurance institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country (year of dataset)</th>
<th>Type of social insurance institutions</th>
<th>Inequality</th>
<th>Poverty (%)&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gini</td>
<td>Total population 25–59 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States (1986)</td>
<td>Basic security</td>
<td>.346</td>
<td>.341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom (1989)</td>
<td>Basic security</td>
<td>.340</td>
<td>.340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada (1987)</td>
<td>Basic security</td>
<td>.290</td>
<td>.289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland (1987)</td>
<td>Basic security</td>
<td>.331</td>
<td>.334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia (1989)</td>
<td>Targeted</td>
<td>.308</td>
<td>.302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland (1982)</td>
<td>Basic security</td>
<td>.330</td>
<td>.315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark (1987)</td>
<td>Basic security</td>
<td>.245</td>
<td>.225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands (1987)</td>
<td>Basic security</td>
<td>.271</td>
<td>.272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy (1986)</td>
<td>State corporatist</td>
<td>.310</td>
<td>.307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France (1989)</td>
<td>State corporatist</td>
<td>.331</td>
<td>.329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (1984)</td>
<td>State corporatist</td>
<td>.254</td>
<td>.249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium (1988)</td>
<td>State corporatist</td>
<td>.236</td>
<td>.231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway (1986)</td>
<td>Encompassing</td>
<td>.222</td>
<td>.211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden (1987)</td>
<td>Encompassing</td>
<td>.206</td>
<td>.204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland (1987)</td>
<td>Encompassing</td>
<td>.201</td>
<td>.196</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total population = 20 years or older.

<sup>a</sup>Less than 50% of median income.
9–12, and the three encompassing countries to have ranks 13–15. Overall these expectations are born out reasonably well. Thus, among the basic security and targeted countries, the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Ireland, Australia, and Switzerland show expected high ranks. Basic security New Zealand, for which we have only limited data on income distribution, would also appear to have a relatively high inequality. Among the basic security countries, however, The Netherlands and Denmark have lower relative levels of inequality and poverty than what we have expected, while among the state corporatist countries, France and Italy rank higher than expected. State corporatist Belgium and Germany have the expected medium levels of inequality. Medium levels of inequality and poverty would also appear to characterize Austria, for which only limited data are available. In terms of average ranks, the lowest overall levels of inequality and poverty are found in encompassing Finland, Sweden, and Norway.

Looking at the overall patterns in the data, the highest levels of inequality and poverty tend to be found in the United States and the United Kingdom. Targeted Australia has a moderate degree of poverty among the elderly, but high poverty rates among children. Belgium, with the state corporatist model, comes relatively close to the encompassing countries and differs most clearly in terms of the relatively high degree of poverty among the elderly. Relative levels of inequality and poverty in Denmark and The Netherlands, as well as in Italy and France, deviate from our expectations. In basic security Denmark, the level of income inequality is relatively modest, while levels of poverty, especially among the elderly, are relatively high. In basic security Netherlands the degree of income inequality tends toward the high side, while the level of poverty among the elderly appears to be very low. In state corporatist Italy and France, relative inequality is higher than we have expected. These deviations from expectations are discussed below.

Focusing on poverty among single mothers we find largely the same pattern of inequalities as among the other population categories. Thus among the basic security and targeted countries poverty rates tend to be high, but exceptions here again are Denmark and The Netherlands. The state corporatist countries would not appear to be especially effective in protecting their single mothers, and comparatively high poverty rates among them are found not only in France and Italy but also in Germany. Among the encompassing countries single mothers' poverty rates are unexpectedly high in Norway, something which probably reflects policies generating a low level of labor force participation among them.
Types of Welfare State Institutions and Patterns of Class and Gender Inequalities

The discussions above indicate that among our eighteen countries the relative strength of different political tendencies, as well as organized religion, tend to be transmitted via welfare state institutions in the areas of social insurance and gender policies to affect patterns of class inequality and gender inequality in specific ways. In view of the long time during which these developments have unfolded, time measured in centuries rather than in decades, and the complicated processes involved therein, we should not expect to find simple and clear-cut patterns. Yet although Clio has here painted with broad strokes and too many of her patterns are difficult to decipher, still some recognizable constellations appear to emerge. We will here combine institutional structures with regard to social insurance and gender policies into an institutional typology of welfare states. The partisan political background to institutional differences will be discussed and institutional structures are related to patterns of inequalities. We will also suggest hypotheses that appear fruitful in accounting for unexpected outcomes.

In countries where secular conservative-centrist parties have been most influential, we expect to find social insurance institutions implying only limited encroachment into market distributive processes as well as market-oriented gender policies, that is, the targeted/market-oriented type of welfare state or the basic security/market-oriented institutional combination. In countries where left political tendencies have been strong, however, efforts to decrease class inequality via political interventions may gradually have weakened traditional resistance to gender equality. This leads us to expect that in these countries we will find the encompassing/dual-earner constellation. In countries where confessional parties have been dominant, however, we are likely to find the state corporatist/family support combination.

At the end of the 1980s, these four institutional types of welfare states relevant for gender as well as class inequality cover fourteen of our eighteen countries (Table 6). The targeted/market-oriented type is thus found in Australia. The basic security/market-oriented model characterizes Canada, New Zealand, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The state corporatist/general family support combination appears in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and Italy. The encompassing/dual-earner constellation is found in Finland, Norway, and Sweden. In the remaining four countries we find unexpected combinations of social insurance and gender policy institutions. Thus a basic security/general family support constella-
Table 6. Relationships of institutional models of social insurance and gender policy to inequality with respect to class and gender in eighteen countries 1985–1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Institutional models of social insurance/gender policy</th>
<th>Class inequality</th>
<th>Gender inequality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Basic security/market oriented</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Basic security/market oriented</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Basic security/market oriented</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>(Medium)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Basic security/market oriented</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Basic security/market oriented</td>
<td>(High)</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Targeted/market oriented</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Basic security/general family support</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Basic security/general family support</td>
<td>Medium*</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Basic security/dual earner</td>
<td>Medium*</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>State corporatist/general family support</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>State corporatist/general family support</td>
<td>High*</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>State corporatist/general family support</td>
<td>High*</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>State corporatist/general family support</td>
<td>High*</td>
<td>Medium*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>State corporatist/general family support</td>
<td>(Medium)</td>
<td>(Medium)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>State corporatist/market oriented</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>High*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Encompassing/dual earner</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Encompassing/dual earner</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Encompassing/dual earner</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Unexpected level of inequality, given type of institutions.

The institutional constellations in the latter four countries would appear to reflect historical processes of change. Thus in strongly Catholic Ireland, basic security social insurance institutions were introduced while the country was part of Britain. Efforts to move in the state corporatist direction in the 1930s failed, something probably reflecting that the heyday of corporatist ideology was already passing (Korpi 1992; Whyte 1971). The central role of the Catholic Church and its close relation to the main political parties in Ireland has helped to mold its relatively limited gender policies according to a general family support model. More recent political power struggles are found behind the same constellation of institutions in the Dutch...
welfare state. In The Netherlands conflicts between the social democratic and the confessional parties and unions in the decades after World War II resulted in a change from state corporatist to basic security pension institutions, while the confessional parties were successful in strengthening a general family support policy.

The basic security/dual-earner model in Denmark makes it differ from Finland, Norway, and Sweden in ways that reflect outcomes of political strife. As in the other three Nordic countries, also in Denmark in the 1950s and 1960s, the Social Democratic labor movement attempted to change the basic security social insurance model into an encompassing one but failed in these efforts. However, a relatively strong left tendency has been of significance for the development of a dual-earner gender policy model. Japan, with a corporatist/market dominance model, began by introducing social insurance institutions patterned on basic traits of the German model during the Meiji restoration period. In the context of a cultural tradition different from those in our other countries, the dominant conservative-centrist Liberal Democratic Party allowed for some state interventions into the regulation of industry but contained interventions in the sphere of the family, where traditional patterns were supported by cultural and religious forces.

As discussed above, in terms of class inequality reflected in the distribution of disposable household income, in relative terms we expect the targeted as well as the basic security model to be associated with high inequality, the state corporatist one with a medium level, and the encompassing model with low inequality. In the area of gendered agency poverty reflected in labor force participation rates, the dual-earner gender policy model is expected to generate a relatively low level of gender inequality, the general family support model a high level of inequality, and the market-oriented model to fall somewhere in between. In Table 6, we have information on the outcomes of 35 of these predictions, 27 of which confirm our expectations.

The eight deviant predictions are equally distributed with respect to class and gender inequality. Again some hypotheses of relevance for these deviant cases can be suggested. As noted above, Denmark and The Netherlands have lower levels of income inequality than other countries with basic security social insurance institutions. Here one may hypothesize that the comparatively strong position of left forces in Denmark has contributed to soften income differences found in other basic security countries. In The Netherlands a combination of very strong confessional parties and a relatively strong left may have contributed to similar consequences. The unexpectedly high level of income inequality in Italy with state corporatist social insurance institutions and a strong confessional party may partly re-
reflect marked interregional income differences between the north and the south. Furthermore, during the decades of the Cold War, because of the special position of Italy within NATO, the competitive pressures felt by the dominant Christian Democratic party from the left were probably limited. France, with a corporatist/general family support institutional constellation, deviates from expectations both with respect to our class and gender inequality indicators. As noted above, however, in this country secular conservative-centrist parties have dominated the political scene, while the left has been fragmented and the confessional party was gradually dissolved. A hypothesis in this context is that while the heritage of state corporatist social insurance institutions has been retained, policies relevant for class inequality have had a market liberal stance, and gender relevant policies may have been influenced more by a pronatalist than by confessional thinking.

The relatively high level of gender inequality in the Australian labor force may partly reflect long traditions of family wage principles in the compulsory arbitration system and that in the decades after World War II labor demand was largely solved by immigrant labor. In Japan, culturally different from the other countries in this study, the tradition of three-generation families may help to account for a higher level of gender inequality in labor force participation rates than what is found in other countries with a market-oriented gender policy model. Furthermore, in Japan as well as in Australia, we find markedly negative attitudes toward women’s employment. In terms of gender inequality, Austria, with a general family support model constitutes a marginal case. Thus while our rough estimate on overall differences between men and women is at a medium level, gender inequality in labor force participation rates is affected by marital status and the presence of preschool children to a relatively high degree. In comparison with the other countries having a dual-earner gender policy model, the relatively high gender differences in the Norwegian labor force may at least partially reflect the relatively strong presence of a Lutheran confessional party in postwar governments.

A finding of interest here is that among these countries, according to the indicators used here, class inequality and gender inequality would not appear to be closely correlated. The rank correlation for the fifteen countries for which we have information on both variables is thus low (Spearman’s Rho = 0.20). This largely reflects the fact that welfare state institutional constellations often have asymmetrical effects on patterns of relative inequality in terms of gender and class. Thus only the encompassing/dual-earner constellation is expected to have symmetrical effects on relative levels of inequality with respect to class as well as gender. The targeted/market-oriented model as
well as the basic security/market-oriented combination are likely to generate high class inequality but medium levels of gender inequality, while in contrast the state corporatist/general family support combination is expected to lead to the opposite pattern of relative inequalities.

Faces of Inequality

Gender inequalities as well as class inequalities appear with many faces. The three arenas of gendered agency inequality discussed here—political representation, access to tertiary education, and participation in the labor force—show only modest levels of “crystallization” in the sense of intercountry correlations between levels of inequality in these respects. Thus in the mid-1990s, gender differences in access to tertiary education are very low in almost all of our countries, yet major differences remain with respect to political representation and labor force participation. An example here is Ireland, with no gender differences in access to tertiary education among the cohorts born in the 1960s, but at the same time the highest level of differences in labor force participation among our countries and above average differences in political representation. Also the intercountry correlation between levels of gender differences in political representation and in labor force participation is modest.

Intercountry patterns of gender inequalities are changing over time and have possibly been more crystallized some decades ago. Thus our data indicate that in the cohorts born in the 1930s, in political cultures markedly influenced by confessional parties, gender differences in access to tertiary education were relatively high. As noted above, with respect to labor force participation these countries still have relatively high gender differences. They also show relatively high gender differences in political representation. Similar levels of gender differences in political representation are also found in countries dominated by secular conservative-centrist parties. In the latter category of countries, however, the presence of electoral systems with voting for individual candidates can be of relevance for the low levels of women’s representation. Our data thus suggest the hypothesis that at least in the countries and areas discussed here, gender differences are affected by multiple sets of relatively independent factors and processes. Such a dispersed causal background may also help to explain the low level of correlation between gender and class inequality as measured by the distribution of income. A hypothesis here is that different indicators of class inequality are likely to exhibit a more homogeneous syndrome than those of gender inequality.63

Comparative students of welfare states have based their proposals
for welfare state typologies on observed similarities and differences among countries. Since their eyes have been caught by roughly similar features of existing welfare states, it is not surprising that on the descriptive level most of these typologies tend to result in a fair degree of overlap in the categorization of countries. The fruitfulness of typologies therefore should not be judged primarily in terms of the degree of novelty in the categorization of countries. Instead, the heuristic value of typologies in the comparative analysis of causes and consequences of welfare states should be in the foreground. An additional criterion is the degree of precision with which countries can be categorized and changes in these categorizations can be measured.

The typology of welfare states presented here differs from its several predecessors in at least three ways. Thus it would appear to be the first explicit attempt to create a typology for the analysis of inequalities with respect to gender as well as class. Second, as far as possible, it is based on indicators characterizing the structure of welfare state institutions. While global typologies reflecting a conglomerate of causes and sundry aspects of program characteristics as well as policy outcomes can be valuable for descriptive purposes, in attempts to understand causes and consequences of welfare states, a focus on institutional structures as intervening variables is likely to be more fruitful. Such an analytical typology not only points at differences among countries, it can also be fruitful in attempts to understand why there are differences and what effects of differences we can expect. Third, while a categorization of institutional structures presents some problems of judgment, it is likely to give much more precise descriptions and thereby better possibilities for the analysis of change than do typologies based on patterns of correlations between various variables.

Some of the problems with extant typologies can be exemplified by what in current parlance is referred to as "the social democratic welfare state regime." An overview of the policies actually pursued by social democratic parties in our countries indicates that "a social democratic model" does not exist in the sense of a shared theoretical ideal or a goal pursued in practical policies by the great majority of social democratic parties (Korpi 1998). Thus in the countries of continental Europe, after the end of World War II social democratic parties attempted to modify state corporatist institutions in the direction of basic security, attempts partially succeeding only in The Netherlands. However, in Britain and Denmark social democrats endeavored to change the basic security model into an encompassing one but failed. Similar social democratic attempts were successful in Finland, Norway, and Sweden. Except for a period in the 1970s with a stress on universalism, the Australian Labour Party has been
wedded to the targeted model of social insurance. In New Zealand, the Labour Party has supported a mixture of universalism and targeting.

In view of these diversities to describe, for example, the welfare states in The Netherlands and Denmark as “social democratic” would not appear to be highly informative. With their basic security social insurance programs, these two countries clearly differ from Finland, Norway, and Sweden. Presumably as a result of the political influence of primarily confessional parties, but to some extent also of the social democratic party, The Netherlands has a less unequal income distribution than other basic security countries, but more so than the encompassing ones. The same pattern of relative inequality is also found in Denmark. On the other hand, in terms of gender policies The Netherlands and Denmark have very different models and greatly different levels of female labor force participation. By referring to welfare states in terms of the constellations of institutional structures in their social insurance programs as well as gender policies, we achieve a considerably higher degree of precision in descriptions as well as in the analysis of change, and are also likely to find a more fruitful approach in the study of the causes and consequences of welfare states.

The difficulty in applying welfare state typologies focusing on class in the analysis of gender inequalities indicates that the forces driving the development of policies and of inequalities in these two areas may have worked at cross purposes. The discussion here draws attention to the special role played in this context by confessional parties in the western countries with respect to gender inequality, something which differentiates them not only from left parties but also from secular parties of conservative-centrist colors. Confessional parties thus appear to have been Janus faced with respect to inequality. On the one hand, they have attempted to form an alternative to socialism and capitalism, thereby accepting some degree of political interventionism, especially that related to the reduction of poverty. On the other hand, they have seen the maintenance of the traditional nuclear family as basic for the moral integration of society and have encouraged women to remain mothers and housewives. Thereby they have indirectly supported what now appear as agency inequalities with respect to gender. On the secular conservative-centrist side, however, a programmatic aversion against political interventions into markets would appear to have made it more difficult to accept policies to reduce gender inequalities. By leaving the search for gender equality to individual citizens largely unsupported by public policies, such a market-oriented policy stance is likely to have had less impact on gender inequalities than have more interventionist policies.
favored by left parties. The pattern of historical development with respect to gender inequalities in terms of political representation, tertiary education, and labor force participation indicates that an ideological stance in favor of decreasing class inequality combined with a principled openness to political interventions may have facilitated acceptance of interventions to reduce inequalities also with respect to gender.

Existing policy mixes reflect influences from multiple and conflicting political forces with often overlaid effects. Any typology is thus associated with "deviant" cases. Against this background it is therefore encouraging that fourteen of our eighteen countries are covered by four combinations of class- and gender-relevant welfare state institutions: the targeted/market-oriented model, the basic security/market-oriented model, the corporatist/general family support model, and the encompassing/dual-earner model. In the remaining four countries historical developments have generated different institutional constellations that can be described by the typology presented here. Furthermore, with its combination of social insurance institutions and gender policy institutions, this typology provides quite helpful approaches to the explanation of overall patterns of relative inequalities in terms of gendered agency poverty in the labor force, as well as of inequalities in income distribution and poverty. Our typology is especially helpful in locating and explaining asymmetrical outcomes in patterns of relative inequalities in terms of gender and class. Observed deviations and unexpected outcomes offer interesting cases for hypotheses concerning causal processes and patterns of development.

The simultaneous analysis of inequalities with respect to gender as well as class provides additional clues to potential causal processes. Of special interest here is the development of inequalities in the *longue durée*. In his now classic 1949 speech, T. H. Marshall, surveying the long-term development of class inequalities in Britain, wrote about the "modern drive towards social equality," stating that "the modern drive towards social equality is, I believe, the latest phase of an evolution of citizenship which has been in continuous progress for some 250 years" (1950, 10). Although Marshall did not consider gender inequality, it appears that with the gradual emergence of civil, political, and social citizenship for long periods, equality with respect to gender as well as class grew in roughly parallel ways, as if gender and class equality were, if not twins, at least siblings. Half a century later, taking stock of the continued development of inequalities with respect to class and gender, we must ask to what extent the two are actually related or if, instead, they stem from different houses.
Experiences during the last quarter of the twentieth century indicate that in many respects, class inequalities appear to have been considerably more resistant to reduction than are gender inequalities. As noted above, while gender inequalities with respect to excess mortality and access to tertiary education have responded well to political attempts at reduction in our countries, class inequalities have been much more resistant to such efforts. Thus class inequalities in terms of life expectancy have not been eradicated. For example, in the 1990s in these rich countries, among men 45–65 years of age, the risk of dying is considerably higher for manual workers than for men in higher socioeconomic classes (Kunst 1996; Lundberg 1991; Vågerö and Leon 1994).

Furthermore, in spite of explicit policies in most countries to equalize access to higher education, in contrast to the vanishing gender inequalities, class inequalities still remain. Only in a few countries, among them Sweden, Norway, Germany, and The Netherlands, have socioeconomic inequalities in educational opportunities decreased during the twentieth century (Goldthorpe 1996; Shavit and Blossfeld 1993). Thus, for example, Sweden’s massive political efforts in the period after World War II to eradicate class inequality as well as gender inequality in access to higher education were successful in the latter respect. However, while class inequality in educational opportunity decreased up to the mid-1970s, since then this decrease has tapered off at a level where major socioeconomic inequalities in terms of access to tertiary education remain (Jonsson, forthcoming).

In a long-term perspective socioeconomic differences with respect to material standards of living would appear to have decreased. However, studies on the development of inequalities in the distribution of household income indicate that after the early 1980s, in many countries the tendency toward declining inequalities was halted and even reversed, most dramatically so in the United States and the United Kingdom (Atkinson, Rainwater, and Smeeding 1995; Gottschalk and Smeeding 1997). While earnings differences between men and women have been slow to decrease, in that area no reversal of the decreasing trend is obvious. In this context it is also important to consider long-term changes in levels of unemployment, an often overlooked indicator of class inequality. As is well known, unemployment disproportionately hits lower socioeconomic categories. Therefore the disappearance of recurring periods of mass unemployment characterizing the industrialized countries up to World War II and the arrival in most of our countries of full employment in the decades after 1945 can be seen as a major decrease in class inequality. In the same perspective, however, the return of mass unemploy-
ment after the 1970s, especially in the western European countries, is a major reversal of the trend of declining class inequalities (Korpi 1991).

As a result of these apparent differences between gender and class in resistance to inequality reduction, during the last quarter of the twentieth century the long roughly parallel courses of decreasing inequalities in these two spheres have thus parted company. The return of mass unemployment since the early 1970s signaled an abrupt upward turn in the development of class inequality, something which is reflected also in the tendencies toward increasing differences in material standards of living. At the same time, however, gender inequalities have largely continued along the decreasing path, at least in terms of agency inequality in areas of tertiary education, political representation, and labor force participation. In fact, since the early 1970s, in many countries we find an accelerating decrease in gender inequality in these three areas.

The once largely parallel but now diverging paths that can be observed in the development of inequalities with respect to gender and class would appear to indicate that inequalities in these areas are driven by partly different, partly common forces. Among a multitude of factors of relevance in this context, the changing role of the family in economic life would appear to be relevant. A hypothesis here is that as long as families were the main repositories for wealth and economic power, and central channels for the creation and transfer of wealth, decision making, and power within the family was highly relevant for economic inequality as well as for gender inequality. However, with the gradual emergence since the nineteenth century of juridical persons for the control of wealth and transmission of economic power, the most important one being the shareholding company, the family has gradually lost a major part in this type of economic role. While primitive male utility probably always has formed a significant factor in the resistance to gender equality, once the family had lost its major economic role in terms of the production and control over wealth, one important base for gender inequality was gradually eroded. In contrast, the sphere of production and position in the labor force have retained their central role as arenas for distributive strife and as a basis for socioeconomic stratification.

While the rate and nature of reductions in gender inequality differ among countries, supporters of equality can rejoice over the notable advances already made in these respects. However, they have no reason to rest on their laurels. Thus, for example, in our countries at the turn of the millennium, on average only one-quarter of the members of national legislatures are women. In all countries significant gendered agency inequalities persist in the main process of socioeco-
economic stratification, that is, the labor force. One could easily add a number of areas not dealt with here; among them the distribution of reproduction work within families, control over reproduction, bodily integrity, and freedom from violence. The diverging paths now apparently taken by the development of inequalities with respect to class and gender indicate that these changes are not simple reflections of evolution or modernization. To improve our understanding of these processes we need to develop both gender and class analysis.

Methodological Appendix

The statistical information in this paper is assembled from a large number of sources, which sometimes give contradictory information. Here only the main sources for the different areas can be listed. Detailed information is available from the author.

Public Day Care


Paid Parental Leave


Labor Force Participation

For most countries in the European Union, the information published by Eurostat on household composition based on labor force surveys leaves much to be desired. For Belgium, Denmark, Germany,
France, Ireland, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, data on women’s labor force participation is from Eurostat (1992), *Women in the European Community* (chap. VII), giving data for 1988. For the other countries, information pertains to 1990 and comes from national labor force surveys or other statistical sources, sometimes complemented by data provided directly from national statistical bureaus.

**Parliaments and Governments**

Main sources are T. T. Mackie and R. Rose (1974), *The International Almanac of Electoral History* (London: Macmillan) and the annual follow-ups in *European Journal of Political Research*, as well as information from *The Inter-Parliamentary Union*, Geneva, and consecutive issues of the *Political Data Yearbook* published as complements to the *European Journal of Political Research*. In the classification of the main political tendencies, the left category includes the traditional socialist and social democratic parties as well as the parties to their left. In the European countries, parties belonging to the Christian Democratic parliamentary grouping in the European Union are classified as confessional. In Ireland, however, to reflect the special historical roots of the major parties as well as their close relationships with the Catholic Church, the Fianna Fáil as well as the Fine Gael are classified as confessional.

**Income Distribution**

In using the LIS database for comparative purposes, a major but little discussed problem is the differences between countries in terms of the proportion of adults within households. Thus, for example, in the Swedish dataset, all children 18 years or older but still living at home are classified as separate households. In several other countries, however, major proportions of households contain three or more adults. In this context, equivalence scales intended to reflect economies of scale within households risk becoming problematic when economies of scale are assumed to be great. We have used an OECD scale assuming only moderate economies of scale, giving the weight of 1.0 to the first adult, 0.7 to the second adult, and 0.5 to each additional person within the household, irrespective of age. Furthermore, the comparisons have been limited to persons 20 years or older.

**NOTES**

Earlier versions of this paper have been presented at the biannual conference of the European Sociological Association in Amsterdam 1999, in the
working group on the welfare state and in the working group on gender at the Swedish Sociological Associations conferences 1998 and 1999, the seminar in Comparative Gender Studies, Department of Sociology, Stockholm University 1999, at the European University Institute in Florence 1999, the Turku-Stockholm conference on “The Welfare State at the Crossroads” in 1999 at the conference of RC 19 in Prague 1999, and at the Winter Seminar of the Norwegian Sociological Association in 1998. I want to thank participants at these meetings for generous and helpful comments. My thanks for valuable comments and help are also due to Klas Åmark, Barbara Hobson, Olli Kangas, John Myles, Ingalill Montanari, Kenneth Nelson, and Joakim Palme as well as to two anonymous referees of this journal. The research has been supported by the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation and the Swedish Social Research Council.

1. While in many countries race, ethnicity, and immigrant status play major roles in the context of inequality, they cannot be considered here.

2. The selection of countries is based on the principle of “most comparable cases” (Lijphart 1975). These countries have a record of uninterrupted political democracy during the period after World War II and a population of more than one million.

3. The class concept is here used in a broad sense to refer to observed regularities in the distribution of material advantage rooted in the sphere of production and position in the labor force. For recent interventions in the long-term debate on the fruitfulness of the class concept, see Goldthorpe and Marshall (1992) and Grusky and Serensen (1998).

4. The concept of agency is here used in a rather broad sense to refer to individuals as purposive, autonomous actors capable of making choices. For discussions see Doyal and Gough (1991) and Lister (1997, 36–41).

5. Since individual and contextual factors affect the capacity of different persons to convert resources or means of achievements into actual achievements, Sen argues that it is important to look at freedom to achieve rather than at resources. His concept of resources is in broad agreement with the concept of power resources (Korpi 1985).

6. Thus, to give a few examples, in France and in the Federal Republic of Germany husbands had the right to prevent their wives from entering paid employment up to 1965 and 1977, respectively, and had complete parental authority up to 1977 and 1980, respectively. In Ireland a marriage bar in the civil services existed up to 1977. As noted below, suffrage was often extended to women later than to men. For an analysis of the development of women’s citizenship rights in Europe, see Therborn (1995, chap. 6).

7. Gendered agency inequalities in these three areas must be considered central enough to warrant analyses, even if this means failing to take on board other important areas of gendered agency inequalities such as control over reproduction, bodily integrity, and freedom from violence.

8. In some countries, such as Finland and Germany, as a result of internal and external upheavals, universal and equal suffrage was achieved at the same time by women and men.
9. In France and Belgium female suffrage was delayed partly because of the fear of anticlerical parties that women would vote for confessional parties. In the United Kingdom and Ireland, female suffrage with the same age of majority as for men did not come until 1928.

10. Women have traditionally voted to a lesser extent than men, but this difference has been decreasing over time and in some countries has been replaced by a slightly higher voting rate for women (Korpi 1983).


12. This distinction is not synonymous with the often made contrast between proportional elections and majority or “first past the post” elections. Where voters choose among party lists, we have proportional elections, but proportionality or semiproportionality can also result from voting for single candidates, as exemplified by electoral systems in Ireland and Japan (see Lijphardt 1984, chap. 9).

13. In the elections of 1984, 1987, 1990, 1993, and 1996, the percentage point increase in women’s representation was 4.4, 3.9, 1.8, 4.7, and 8.0, respectively.

14. In some European countries, confessional parties have also tended to nominate relatively many women.

15. There is a modest positive correlation between equality gaps in the area of education in the elderly population in 1994 and in parliamentary representation in 1990 (Spearman’s Rho = 0.45), with major deviations primarily for the United States, which combines high gender gaps in political representation with low ones in the educational area.

16. To the extent that income is shared within families, the effects of nonparticipation in the stratification process on inequality in material standards of living can at least be partly modified.

17. Esping-Andersen’s seven indicators range from public expenditures for government employee pensions, private sector pensions, private sector health care, and means-tested benefits to the number of occupationally distinct pension programs, average social insurance coverage, and the difference between average and maximum benefit levels. The latter indicators, however, are not used in ways which systematically describe different social insurance institutions.

18. For a discussion of social care, see Daly and Lewis 1999.

19. While institutional structures of social insurance programs and taxation policies can be described in terms of national legislation, the institutional development of social services for children and the elderly usually reflects the combination of a number of different types of policies not only on the national but also on local levels. Furthermore, access to social services of this type depends on the availability of services at a specific time and place. Social rights to services can therefore be described as supply conditioned. Here we have used the extent to which services in these areas are actually provided as indicators of legislation and institutions. In some of these countries we find important regional variations in terms of the nature of child care services.

21. The effect of this limitation is that the strength of dual-earner policies is underestimated in countries where day care services for 3- to 6-year-old children are provided on a full week, full day basis. This would, however, not appear to be very serious, since countries with full day, full week care for 3- to 6-year-old children would also appear to have much higher service levels for the 0- to 2-year-old children than do countries with only part-time care for the somewhat older children. Needless to say, however, short-hour day care for 3- to 6-year-olds can, to some extent, facilitate parental employment.

22. As a baseline for comparisons between countries and over time, we have used the average wage of industrial workers, the primary relevant category for which comparable data are available.

23. Tax benefits include tax allowances (deductions in taxable income) as well as tax credits (deductions in taxes imposed).

24. The specific role of this type of tax benefit to the dependent spouse is examined by Montanari (forthcoming).

25. Of relevance here is the scheduling of hours in primary schools, which may facilitate or hinder parental employment (Gornick, Meyers, and Ross 1997). Unfortunately such information is not available for all our countries.

26. We have not included lump sum or flat rate, typically relatively low maternity benefits, which are not conditioned on previous earnings and are withdrawn if the mother becomes gainfully employed. Because of these marginal effects, parallel to the term "poverty trap," this type of benefit could be described as a "housewife trap."

27. Since 1996, a directive by the European Union requires all member countries to introduce a period of parental leave for fathers where it is already provided for mothers. This directive is being implemented in the different countries.

28. Here Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden with earnings-related and relatively long paternity leave have a score of 2, France and Germany with less generous programs score 1, while all other countries score 0.

29. In view of the problems of reliability in now available data, the categorization of countries is thus tentative, but likely to hold in its broad outlines.

30. It goes without saying that although in these countries have largely refrained from using public policies in their efforts to shape gender relations, in addition to market forces, other factors such as traditions, values, and attitudes are of relevance in this context and are likely to vary among countries (cf. below).

31. Thus some countries with well-developed dual-earner policies, such as Sweden, have also legislated against gender discrimination on the labor market and have introduced a gender equality ombudsman. In countries with strong collective bargaining systems, the need for legislation on women's rights in employment may appear relatively small. Civil rights in the
form of liberties and immunities referring to areas such as divorce, abortion, and body rights have been important for several aspects of gender equality, areas in which the United States has been an international leader.

32. In some countries, ethnicity and language have been of significance in party formation, and in recent decades environmental issues as well.

33. Author's translation from the Swedish version. The concept of subsidiarity, central in Catholic social thinking, accords the family the basic role in maintaining the well-being of citizens, with intermediary levels such as the parish and—as a last resort—the state stepping in only when the family no longer can help.

34. An example of women’s movements working efficiently from outside political parties was given in Sweden in the runup for the 1998 parliamentary elections, when a network of feminists threatened to field a feminist part if the established parties did not increase their nominations of women. This threat was ultimately withdrawn but resulted in the highest proportion so far of women in the parliament and in a government with an equal representation of women and men. For a debate on the role of women’s movements in these contexts, see Tilly (1997) and ensuing comments.

35. All of these countries have been characterized by coalition governments in which left parties have participated relatively often. With the exception of Austria, in all of them confessional parties have had a longer government tenure than the left parties. In Germany the small liberal party (FDP) has participated as a coalition partner with the Social Democrats as well as with the confessional parties (CDU/CSU). In Ireland, where the dominant parties have their roots in the struggle for independence from Britain, Fianna Fáil as well as Fine Gael have traditionally had exceedingly close relations to the country’s Catholic hierarchy (Whyte 1971) and are thus classified here as confessional parties.

36. For discussions of methodological problems in comparative analyses, see Goldthorpe (1997) and Ragin (1997).

37. While in other continental European countries confessional parties were formed in the late nineteenth or early twentieth centuries, in France the confessional Catholic party was established only in 1924 and was gradually dissolved during the 1960s. Among the Protestant countries, however, the Lutheran confessional party in Norway was formed in 1933, thus very early compared to those in Finland (1958), Sweden (1964), and Denmark (1970).

38. Thus, for example, when a centrist coalition government was formed after the 1998 elections, one of the first and symbolic initiatives of the prime minister representing the Christian People’s Party was a proposal for a flat rate maternity allowance going to all mothers who did not use public day care but took individual responsibility for child care (for a discussion, cf. Leira 1998). In this context, Norway’s late industrialization and slow urbanization have been suggested as potential factors of relevance. In these respects, Norway would not appear to differ much from, for example, Finland.

39. For women as well as men, the increasing length of formal education has affected labor force participation rates (for a discussion of these effects, see Schmidt 1993).
40. The average decrease in gender differences has been 31 percentage points, yet the standard deviation has remained around 10 percentage points.

41. The data are based on the size of the labor force relative to the total population 15–64 years of age. The female-male difference in percentage outside the labor force is of course equal to the male-female difference in the percentage in the labor force.

42. It would also have been of interest to look at labor force participation rates among single mothers. Because of deficiencies in the ways in which the Eurostat defines families, it is, however, very difficult to find such information for most of the countries in the European Union.

43. The categories of gender policy institutions can thus be seen as ordered categories.

44. The figures for Austria and Switzerland for 1990 are rough estimates based on extrapolations from differences observed for the 25–54 year category in 1994 and the development of overall female-male differences in labor force participation in the population 15–64 years of age. All comparisons of labor force participation rates in Switzerland are difficult because of its large proportion of “guest workers,” who are included in the labor force but not in population counts, giving Switzerland an extremely high male labor force participation rate in the population 15–64 years of age (sometimes more than 100%). Because of these problems, we will not include Switzerland in the following comparisons.

45. Among these characteristics we find earnings, hours of work, occupational prestige, and conditions of employment.

46. These data have been provided by the OECD.

47. For a discussion, see, for example, Haller (1994).

48. For basic information on the ISSP program, see Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung (1997).

49. For the first seven items, response alternatives are agree strongly, agree, neither agree or disagree, disagree, disagree strongly, and to the last two questions, work full time, work part time, stay home. Negative response alternatives are strongly disagree and disagree to items 1 and 6, strongly agree and agree to items 2–5 and 7, and stay home in response to items 8 and 9.

50. In Ireland, gender attitudes and practices may have been affected by decisions of the European Court of Justice on gender equality in employment.

51. Historical evidence indicates that The Netherlands has had an exceptionally low level of female labor force participation for a very long time (Pott-Buter 1993).

52. As shown by Ellingsaeter (1998), social norms as perceived by citizens with respect to married women’s labor force participation appear to be considerably more restrictive in Norway than in Denmark and Sweden.

53. It must, however, be noted that the effects of social insurance institutions and the effects of our gender policy models to some extent spill into each other. Thus gender policies affecting women’s labor force participation are of relevance for income inequality and poverty rates. Likewise, social
insurance institutions can have gendered effects on labor force participation. One example is the adult dependent allowance in British national insurance, payable only for spouses with no or low earnings. The presence of some degree of overlap in effects need not invalidate the distinctions between policy packages made here.

54. The fifth institutional type of social insurance, the voluntary state supported model, has been of importance in sickness and unemployment insurance, but not in old age pensions, and is no longer dominant in any of our countries.

55. In Australia, the means test has gradually been made increasingly generous, so as to exclude the well-to-do while including the major part of manual workers and lower salaried employees (for a discussion, see Castles 1985).

56. The state corporatist model of social insurance institutions has its roots in the corporatist ideology emerging as a strategy to resolve the “worker question” created by the industrial revolution during the second half of the nineteenth century. To counteract the threat to existing sociopolitical structures posed by the emerging industrial working class and socialist labor movements, the corporatist strategy was to create societal institutions that would counteract broadly based collective class action in the dependent labor force. These institutions would instead segment the dependent labor force along multiple lines of occupational and industrial cleavages and to generate cooperation between employers and employees. This classical corporatist ideology was very influential in Europe during the late nineteenth century and up to World War II. Since the 1970s, however, the terms “corporatism,” “neocorporatism,” or “liberal corporatism” have been widely used to denote political bargaining on the societal level involving employers, employees, and the state. After World War II, this pattern of macrolevel tripartite bargaining has emerged, especially in countries where employees have been strongly organized in unions and left political parties which have had a long-term tenure in governments. To avoid confusion, the term “state corporatism” is here used to refer to corporatist institutions in the original sense of the term. In countries with the state corporatist social insurance model, coverage has been extended by the establishment of separate programs for additional occupational categories and residual programs for the rest.

57. In the United Kingdom, Ireland, and the United States, however, the insured are required to contribute to the financing of programs, something which generates a lower level of coverage than is found in countries where eligibility is based on citizenship or residence.

58. Although the targeted and basic security models represent different strategies of redistribution, with the relatively generous rules for needs testing now found in Australia, it is difficult to predict relative levels of inequality in Australia as compared to the basic security countries.

60. Comparisons based on data excluding the self-employed indicate roughly similar levels of inequality and poverty in Austria and Germany (Atkinson, Rainwater, and Smeeding 1995, chap. 4).

61. From 1964 to 1998 in Norway single mothers with a child up to 10 years of age had the right to remain outside the labor force for a decade with cash assistance equal to the level of the minimum pension (Leira 1996; Seip and Ibsen 1991; Skrede 1998). At the end of the 1980s, the level of labor force participation among single mothers with children 0–6 years of age was 55% in Norway, but 83% in Finland and 91% in Sweden.

62. The long-term development of social insurance institutions in these countries are analyzed in Korpi (1998).

63. Thus, for example, it would be surprising to find countries with large inequalities in the distribution of disposable household income, yet negligible socioeconomic differences in infant mortality rates.

64. In this context, the specific traits of some southern European welfare states, such as the Italian one, provide intriguing examples (Ferrera 1996; Leibfried 1992; Trifiletti 1999).

65. For a debate on the interpretation of inequality measures in this context see Hellevik (1997) and Marshall and Swift (1999).

66. In this context it should be noted that the family may have different types of economic roles with differing consequences for gender inequality. Thus in the Nordic countries the long dominance of family-based dairy farming gave wives an important economic role, something which may have been of importance for creating a tradition less resistant to gender equality than in many other countries.

REFERENCES


